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This paper examines the many factors surrounding the
potential deployment of the long-range strategic cruise
missile focusing on: the technical and strategic asymmetries
including guidance systems, air defense forces, nuclear
weapons targeting vulnerabilities and strategic weapons
essential equivalence; strategic implications including the
missile's impact on the strategic balance and its potential
stabilizing influence on a deterrence model; and implications
on Strategic Arms Negotiations.
It examines how the long-range cruise missile will add
a measure of stability to the strategic deterrent balance
and contribute to the restrained counterforce doctrine.
The sea-launch cruise missile platform would provide a non-
time sensitive reserve weapon capable of inflicting unaccept-
able damage on the adversary, hence increasing the stability
of deterrence.

This study is based on open-source literature. The
views and conclusions contained in this document are those
of the author and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies, either expressed or
implied, of the Department of Defense.
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I. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the many factors surrounding the
potential deployment of the long-range cruise missile
(LRCM) focusing on: technical and strategic asymmetries
including guidance systems, air defense forces, targeting
vulnerabilities and strategic weapons essential equivalence;
strategic implications including the missile's impact on
the strategic balance and its potential stabilizing influ-
ence on a deterrence model; and implications for strategic
arms limitation.
Advances in technology play a key role in the development
of weapon systems and methods of warfare. New weapons
systems introduce new dimensions to warfare and raise
thereby a multitude of political, military and economic
implications. When a new weapons system has great potential
against an adversary's strategic security system, it can
greatly affect the world balance of power and inject new
problems into the continuing negotiations concerning strategic
arms limitation. Current technology promises capabilities
which may have significant impact on the conduct of both
tactical and strategic warfare. Recent advances in the
micro-miniaturization of electronic components and sensor
technology have resulted in the potential development of
a new and unique class of weapon, the strategic cruise
13

missile, having the capability to deliver warheads on
targets with great accuracy.
This study attempts to address the technical, political
and strategic implications that the strategic cruise missile
will have on the deterrent balance between the United States
and the Soviet Union. An effort is made to provide the
reader with sufficient background in a number of key areas
to allow a full understanding of and appreciation for the




The cruise missile is not a new weapon system
concept. Guided missile development can be traced to 1930
when a pulsejet engine was patented by a German engineer.
This engine was perfected during WW-II, allowing the
Germans to build the famous buzz bomb or V-l missile. The
V-l was a pilotless pulsejet, midwing monoplane, lacking
airlerons but using conventional airframe and tail construc-
tion. All guidance and control was accomplished internally
by gyro stabilization and preset compass guidance. The
missile carried a warhead weighing 1988 pounds.
Shortly after the end of WW-II the U.S. Navy began
development of a cruise missile based on experiments with
modified German V-l Loon missiles. In 1947, the Navy began
work on the REGULUS missile which achieved initial
14

operational capability in 1955. The REGULUS-I Missile was
deployed as a Strategic Cruise Missile.
During the period 1954-1965 REGULUS Missiles
were deployed on four diesel submarines, one nuclear sub-
marine, three cruisers and one aircraft carrier. The
REGULUS-I missile had a range of about 500 NM and a speed
of 600 knots. It was controlled by a radar or radio
command guidance system. The missile payload was a 3.8 MT
nuclear warhead.
Ballistic missile technology improvements
enabled the POLARIS missile to be developed decreasing the
emphasis on cruise missile weapon systems. The REGULUS-I
Missile procurement was cancelled in 1958 after some 500
missiles had been built. The REGULUS-II was cancelled at
the same time along with an advanced twin ramjet, Mach 3.5
long-range penetration missile, the TRITON.
Strategic cruise missile research and development
was not actively pursued in the U.S. from 1958 until recent-
ly when long-range cruise missile developments were initiated,
Like the U.S., the Soviets started developing
cruise missiles shortly after WW-II. However, they continued
to dedicate resources to research, development and deployment
of new missile systems. The Soviets deployed their first
missile, the SS-N-1, in 1958 just three years after the U.S.
deployed the REGULUS-I Strategic Cruise Missile. In 1960
the Soviets deployed the short-range SS-N-2 STYX missile,
15

shortly after the U.S. Navy cancelled the REGULUS-II and
TRITON. By 1961, the Soviets deployed their first submarine
and surface-launched cruise missile, the SS-N-3 SHADDOCK.
In subsequent years, the Soviets have continued their cruise
missile developments deploying seven surface and subsurface
missile systems and presently have one under development. 1
They have also developed six air-surface cruise missile
systems. Their continued research and development programs
would probably enable them to deploy state-of-the-art
missile engine, guidance and airframe technology if resources
were brought to bear.
U.S. cruise missile interest was revitalized
by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War when the Israeli destroyer
ELATH was sunk by a Soviet-built SS-N-2 STYX missile.
U.S. interest initially was focused on tactical cruise
missiles. The HARPOON tactical cruise missile program was
born from this renewed interest. HARPOON was designed to
be launched from surface, subsurface and airborne platforms.
The LRCM program is an outgrowth of the HARPOON program
technology and continues the capability of being launched
from a standard 21" submarine torpedo tube.
On 6 June 1972, after the signing of the SALT I




importance of the submarine- launched cruise missile (SLCM)
research and development program. As a result of that
emphasis, a strategic type cruise missile is now in the
prototype development stage. Production is projected to
commence in late 1980 or early 1981.
The LRCM employs new guidance system technology
enabling the missile to be launched from ranges in excess
of 1000 NM, fly at altitudes of about 200 feet and strike
a target with great accuracy. Micro-miniaturization of
electronic components has enabled the development of com-
puters having the capacity to store preprogrammed flight
track data. The LRCM guidance system employs this new
technology by interfacing an inertial navigation system
and a terrain matching guidance system which continuously
updates the missile's intended preprogrammed track position.
The LRCM's radar cross-section is very small and
its low-altitude capability implies that it will be diffi-
cult to detect by known operational air defense radars. This
factor promises high air defense penetration probabilities
making the missile an effective non-time sensitive weapon,
capable of destroying designated targets with surgical
accuracy.
In the past, Soviet cruise missiles were con-
sidered tactical in nature. Recent analysis has indicated
that that assumption may not be entirely accurate. Open-
source literature on Soviet submarine launched cruise
17

missiles indicates that the Soviets would employ their
SLCM's primarily as anti-ship weapons, with secondary
missions of destroying land targets. VAdm V. S. Yakovlev,




"Today the main striking force of the navy consists
of submarines and naval carrying aviation. They are
capable of destroying enemy combat surface ships and
submarines, as well as troop and cargo transports, in
any regions of the world. In addition, they are
capable of carrying out powerful nuclear missile
strikes against enemy shore installations.
"Nuclear submarines are the most powerful types
of combat ships, capable of carrying out a variety of
tasks ... equipped with long-range missiles, homing
torpedoes with nuclear charges, modern sonar equip-
ment for detecting targets and other types of radio-
electronic equipment. Thus, from great distances
they are capable of destroying not only naval targets,
but also installations located along the coast and in
the enemy's rear areas.... The communications equip-
ment installed on the submarines enable them to
maintain contact with their command and to receive
orders at any point in the world.
2Yakovlev, V.S. VAdm, The Soviet Navy
,
Moscow, DOSAAF
Publishing House, Russia, 1969.
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"Modern diesel submarines can successfully perform
reconnaissance operations, harass enemy convoys, destroy
enemy coastal installations with their missiles and
carry out other combat tasks."
Recent congressional hearings have revealed
that Soviet SLCM ranges have been underestimated and the
weapon systems pose a formidable threat to the United States.
Significant statements made at those hearings are as follows: 3
1. The Soviet navy has had nuclear armed strategic
cruise missiles for many years.
2. Soviet missiles are deployed now.
3. At the very least 50% of our population is held
in jeopardy of those missiles.
4. Those Soviet cruise missiles are not regulated
by any treaty.
5. We are unilaterally without arms in this area
while the Soviets have purposefully developed
and deployed strategic cruise missiles.
These revelations require renewed emphasis on the cruise
missile as a strategic weapon system,
b. Asymmetries
U.S. and Soviet cruise missile posture displays
enormous asymmetries as compared to the situation relative
3 U.S. Senate Hearings on the Strategic Cruise Missile
before the Committee on Armed Services, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
on S 920, part 10, Research and Development, April 10, 11, 14,
17 and 21, 1975, p. 5153, Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1975. (Henceforth known as U.S. Senate Hearings.)
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to ballistic missiles. Geographic asymmetries between the
United States and Soviet Union influence the sophistication
and range a cruise missile must possess to attain similar
targeting results. The U.S. coasts are readily accessible
by medium-range missiles launched from submarines whereas
the Soviet borders are inland, for the most part, requiring
long-range missiles having more complex guidance systems.
The Soviets moved a great portion of their industry from
the European sector to east of the Urals during WW- I I which
further complicates the potential accessibility problem.
These asymmetries limit the targeting choices available to
strike counterforce and countervalue targets. The Soviets
have a multitude of targeting options because the majority
of the U.S. population and industry and many counterforce
targets are within present potential cruise missile targeting
range. Forty-three percent of U.S. cities over 100,000
inhabitants are within targeting range of the Soviets'
present deployed cruise missile. 1*
The LRCM will pose a challence to present early
warning systems and air defense forces in both the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. Soviet air defense capabilities are enormous
and far in excess of those of any other country.
Soviet cruise missile navigation guidance and




that U.S. cruise missiles require due to the differences in
geography and targeting. U.S. cruise missile navigation
systems need a self-contained guidance capability to obtain
the accuracies needed to strike targets at ranges in excess
of 1000 NM.
Essential equivalence is based on the desire
to match Soviet counterforce and countervalue capability
and prevent the Soviet Union from attaining numerical
superiority in strategic forces. The Soviets have the
majority of their total megatonnage carried on ballistic
missiles as compared to the U.S. which has the majority of
their megatonnage carried on bombers. Increased warhead
accuracies could potentially gain the Soviets a hard target
kill capability and destabilize the deterrent balance which
presently exists between the two countries. Nuclear war-
head yields carried by Soviet long-range cruise missiles
are small compared to "total" ballistic missile warhead
yields, but utilizing these missiles as a threat against
third-world countries and as a secondary weapon against
U.S. or Allied targets would be formidable; this must be
considered in the strategic arena,
c. Deterrence
The deterrence of general nuclear war is a
fundamental national security objective of the United States
It is not a strategy of war, but one for peace, designed
to convince the opponents that aggression is the least
21

attractive of all alternatives. Deterrence involves no
physical restraint. It is a state of mind induced in
antagonists as the outgrowth of threats, the known capa-
bility to carry them out, and the perceived will to execute,
if necessary. The deterrent aim is almost universally
accepted by U.S. decision makers and the people, but how
to attain it is problematical. Deterrence depends on
credibility and credibility depends on a potent force and
the resoluteness to use that force if required.
A fundamental national security policy of the
United States, promulgated by President Nixon, and still
valid today, is to limit the "numbers, characteristics,
and deployments of our forces [to those] which the Soviet
Union cannot reasonably interpret as being intended to
threaten a disarming attack.*' 5 That policy, translated into
a Department of Defense planning criterion for nuclear
sufficiency, prohibits "providing [any] incentive for the
Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis." 6
The LRCM satisfies that policy and will afford
the President of the United States that additional strategic
flexibility essential for attaining U.S. foreign policy
5 Nixon, R. M. , Foreign Policy for the 1970s
,
p. 131,
25 February 1971, Washington: U.S. Uovt. Print. Off., 1971
5 Laird, M. , Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee on the FY 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972
Defense Budget, p. 62, 9 March 1971.
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objectives. The non-time sensitive nature of the missile
cannot be perceived as a first-strike weapon, but its
surgical strike accuracy will allow the president increased
options in employing strategic weapons to demonstrate
resolve should an adversary attempt to coerce the United
States into an unfavorable political or military situation.
The missile's invulnerability contributes to the
stability of the deterrence model making it a desirable
reserve weapon system capable of inflicting unacceptable
damage on the Soviet Union should they initiate a pre-
emptive first strike against the U.S. The Soviets' deploy-
ment of cruise missiles is a demonstrated example of the
confidence they place in the missile's potential contribution
to deterrence and its capability to influence foreign policy
objectives
.
d. Strategic Arms Limitation
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which
opened in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, mark the beginning
of a new era in Soviet-American strategic relations. For
a decade or more, the two nuclear powers have geared their
strategic policies to the dynamics of an expanding missile
technology. Each has attempted to employ new technologies
to weapon systems, possibly not so much because the results
could be translated into practical political uses, but
because it was felt that a failure to keep pace might
forfeit some future advantage to the adversary. Almost
23

without intending it, the two powers have derived a security
from this effort- -a security based on a tacit understanding
that neither could destroy the other without suffering
destruction in return. The Vladivostok agreement signed on
November 24, 1974, did not restrict the continued technical
improvements in ballistic missiles and did not restrict the
deployment of the sea-launched cruise missile being developed
as a reserve weapon system. The Vladivostok agreement has
not been published and hence the majority of the understand-
ings are still unknown. The Vladivostok understanding in
its present form is believed to provide that air-launched
missiles with a range in excess of 600 Km (324 NM) will be
counted against the overall ceiling of 2,400 delivery
vehicles. The Department of Defense does not agree with
that understanding and will address the issue at the SALT II
negotiations. According to open-source literature, the
Soviets are attempting to limit the sea-launched cruise
missile to the same range restrictions which is not attractive
to the U.S. because of the geographic and targeting asymme-




An examination of the long-range cruise missile is made
using descriptive, correlational and explanatory methodolo-
gies. The descriptive methodology is used to formulate the
problem and provide the background needed to understand the
complex interactions between the technical, geographic and
political asymmetries, how they influence the potential
strategic balance, and how they may impact on a strategic
deterrent model. A correlation methodology is used to
analyze these asymmetries with the intent of highlighting
those factors which could potentially favor one nation and
destabilize the present and future strategic balance.
Strategic and technical data are utilized to correlate
present and projected potential targeting vulnerabilities.
Weapon system performance characteristics are modeled to
assess aggregate essential equivalence, its potential impact
on the conduct of foreign policy and its impact on potential
war fighting capabilities. An explanatory methodology is
used to demonstrate the cause-and-effect relationships that
arise when strategic force capabilities are significantly
altered and what their resultant impact may be on a simpli-






Current technology promises weapons with capabilities
which could have a significant impact on the conduct of tacti
cal and strategic warfare. The destruction of a target,
either tactical or strategic, by means of either conventional
or nuclear explosives requires: knowledge of the location
of the target in space as a function of time, ability to
resolve the target from its surroundings and the ability to
deliver the warhead against it with a spatial error smaller
than the destructive radius of the explosive charge. A
weapon with a small kill-radius delivered with a great
accuracy against a target would, in many cases, be the most
cost-effective and efficient means of destruction. The
probability of destruction of the target increases when
either the error in delivery of the weapon is decreased
(that is, increasing its accuracy), its destructive radius
is increased or the number of weapons delivered against
the target is increased. Increasing the delivery accuracy
of a weapon is much more preferable to increasing the kill-
radius of the weapon or the number of weapons delivered upon
a target in terms of a net cost of a given capability.
Increasing the kill-radius, that is, the yield, (this is
especially true for conventional weapons) almost certainly
26

implies a greater increase of its mass and at the same time
causes much more unnecessary collateral damage. Increasing
the number of weapons delivered against a target requires a
large number of delivery vehicles, personnel to control
and service these vehicles, additional facilities for repair,
transportation systems to deliver supplies and large numbers
of these relative inaccurate weapons deployed to the theater
of operation. Commensurate attrition rates of these support
facilities caused by enemy action must also be included in
the numbers planned. All these factors add up to a sub-
stantial economic penalty when considering the numbers of
weapons required to provide an adequate deterrent posture.
It is logical then that a weapon with a small destructive
radius, delivered with great accuracy against a target,
either mobile or stationary, would in most cases be both
more cost effective and less randomly destructive than
relatively inaccurate high-yield weapons delivered in large
numbers
.
High accuracy can be achieved either by allowing
the missile to seek, recognize and home on its intended
target or through providing it with accurate attitude, etc.
Target recognition without human intervention, a desirable
condition for a long-range weapon, is a challenging technical
problem. The problem of accurate pre-programmed flight is
only slightly less complex.
27

Thus, high accuracy delivery of weapons to a target
is dependent on the development of reliable, light, miniature,
relatively inexpensive electronic devices that can be
mounted on a missile and which would typically occupy less
than 20 per cent of the volume of the missile and about
the same proportion of the useful payload. 7 As the opera-
tional range of the weapon is increased, the complexity and
size of the electronic equipment needed for the guidance
of the missile usually increases significantly. Increased
size allows the accommodation of more elaborate electronic
components required to maintain low missile track errors.
These errors usually magnify as the range of the missile
increases. If the target is not visually or instrumentally
accessible from the point of launch, even more elaborate
sensing and guiding equipment is needed, since recognition
becomes much more difficult.
Having reviewed some key factors involved in
accurately delivering weapons on targets, an examination
will be made of the missile engine and guidance technology
asymmetries which could enable the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to
attain a LRCM countervalue strike capability.
a. Missile Power Plant Asymmetries
Power plant requirements needed to strike both
counterforce and countervalue targets are different for
7 Stockhold International Peace Research Institute, World
Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1975
,
p. 314, MTT
Press, 1975. (Henceforth known as 1975 SIPRI.)
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the Soviet Union and the United States. The U.S. requires
longer ranged missiles to attain a strike capability. High
efficiency engines are being developed to gain additional
range without increasing the missile size. Small turbofan
engine R§D and testing promise the potential of yielding a
power plant capable of being installed in the HARPOON
missile airframe. Replacing the HARPOON sensor system with
a smaller guidance package will allow more fuel volume
enabling longer engine burn time to obtain the projected
1500-2000 NM range.
The Soviet Union requires only half the range of
the U.S. to attain an equivalent countervalue strike capa-
bility. The SS-N-3 cruise missile deployed aboard the
ECHO-II class submarine has a range of approximately
550 NM. 8 The large size of the SS-N-3 missile (42 feet
long) 9 and its turbojet propulsion system qualify it as a
strategic cruise missile. 10 By comparison the proposed
U.S. LRCM is 20.5 feet long including the booster. The
large SS-N-3 missile size enables the Soviets the
8 Hotz, R. , "Pitfalls of SALT- II," Aviation Week g Space
Technology
,
v. 103, p. 9, 15 December 1975.
9 See Appendix A.
10 Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
"Shaddock-Armed
Soviet Subs in Cuba," v. 103, p. 13, 24 November 1975.
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"...capability to more than double ... that range... by making
relatively simple and undetectable propulsion and operational
changes. With even their present range, the Shaddock can
reach a large percentage of U.S. population centers and the
bulk of U.S. industrial sinews, which are mainly in coastal
belts." 11
The SS-N-3 missile is an old design. Reasonably
increased SS-N-3 performance capability projections can be
made by comparing the size and perceived aerodynamic charac-
teristics with current U.S. cruise missile and aircraft
state-of-the-art technology. It is assumed that the Soviets
can attain the same engine technology level if adequate
resources are brought to bear.
A scaled comparison was made between the SS-N-3 12
the proposed U.S. strategic cruise missile, 13 and Northrop
Aircraft Division F-5E Aircraft 11* line drawings. The F-5E
was selected because, when scaled to 42 feet it more closely
approximates the aerodynamic characteristic of the SS-N-3
than the U.S. strategic cruise missile. It is reasonable
to assume that the Soviets would probably use the same
xl Hotz, op. cit.
12 Pretty, R. and Archer, D. , Jane's Weapon Systems
1974-1975
,
p. 54, Paultone House, 1975.
13 U.S. Senate Hearings, op. cit.




launcher platforms if they upgrade the SS-N-3 technology.
It is also reasonable to assume they would probably use a
missile which was similar in size to the SS-N-3 because it
could be deployed on the same launcher possibly without
any modification.
Scaling the volume and weight dedicated to
various functions of the F-5E allows estimates of the SS-N-3
missile's weight, lift to drag (L/D) ratio and velocity for
maximum range to be made. Scaling the weight of the F-5
aircraft less the landing gear, cockpit and other non-
essential components, the SS-N-3 can be reasonably
estimated to weigh about 10,000 pounds. Computing the wing
area and comparing L/D ratios of other low wing-area air-
craft (the F-105 has a L/D of about 9), a L/D ratio of 10
may be a reasonable estimate. Factoring in state-of-the-
art engine, guidance, warhead and airframe technology,
reasonable estimates can be made of the volume and weight
ratios these components occupy. Electronic guidance compo-
nents capable of placing warheads on countervalue targets
with reasonable accuracy might typically occupy approxi-
mately 10% of the missile volume and about the same pro-
portion of the useful payload.
The J-85-4A non-afterburning turbojet engines
installed in the F5 aircraft occupy about 25% of the
fuselage volume and about 20% of the aircraft weight. The
J-85 specific fuel consumption (SFC) at mach .9 and at
31

36,000 feet is 1.22 pounds. SFC is the amount of fuel per
hour of operation per pound of engine thrust the aircraft
requires. A state-of-the-art low bypass ratio turbofan
engine that would fit into the three-foot 15 diameter SS-N-3
missile might typically occupy 20% of the volume and 20%
of the total weight of the missile. SFC rates for such an
engine might be close to one operated at altitude and at
maximum cruise range.
The body, wings and tail of the F-5 aircraft
occupy about 30% of the weight of the aircraft. The F-5
is a high-performance aircraft though capable of withstanding
high G forces throughout the life of the aircraft. The
SS-N-3 would probably not be designed to as high a specifi-
cation since the airframe is expendable. With the reduced
performance requirements the airframe might typically
occupy 20% of the total weight and about the same proportion
of the volume.
The remaining factors which must be considered
are the warhead and the fuel. Assuming the Soviets continue
their policy of building missiles with high yields, a 1 MT
warhead may be a reasonable size weapon the Soviets might
employ in an upgraded SS-N-3 missile. "Current nuclear
warhead technology permits the manufacture of small war-
heads with about one kiloton TNT equivalent yield per
1 5 Pretty and Archer, op. cit.
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pound of warhead weight. Thus, a 200 KT warhead will weigh
about 200 pounds." 15 Assuming that yield and weight scale
proportionately, a 1 MT weapon would weigh about 1000 pounds,
101 of the weight of the missiles. It may be reasonable to
assume that the warhead would not occupy more than 201 of
the volume of the missile.
The projected weights and volumes of the compo-
nent parts are listed in Table I. The remaining portions of
the missile not already discussed are 40% of the weight and
30% of the volume which will be considered available for
fuel. The SS-N-3 missile volume was estimated by consider-
ing its length to be 40 feet (decreased by two feet to
account for fuselage taper) and having a three-foot diameter.
2Applying the cylinder volume equation irr L, approximately
280 cubic feet are obtained.
JP-4 jet fuel weighs about 6.5 pounds per gallon
and there are about eight gallons of JP-4 per cubic foot of
volume. Eighty-four cubic feet of missile space would
accommodate about 670 gallons. That amount of fuel would
weigh about 4,350 pounds which is 350 pounds more than the
total missile was estimated to weigh. For simplicity it
will be assumed that the 350 pounds is distributed through-
out the remaining missile components and the missile fuel
capacity is 4000 pounds.




Estimated Weight and Volume Parameters
of Possible SS-N-3 Follow-on
Component % Wt. # Wt. % Vol. Ft 3
Airframe 20 2000 20 56




Guidance 10 10 28
Warhead 10 20 56
Fuel 40 30 84
Totals 100 10,000 100 280
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The J85 turbojet engine consumes about 1300
pounds of fuel per hour at mach .9 at 36,000 feet. A
similar Soviet engine installed in the SS-N-3 would have
sufficient fuel to operate approximately three hours. Three
hours at even Mach .8 (about 430 MPH) would enable the
missile to fly 1320 miles.
Analyzing the missile's performance capabilities
using a turbofan engine and a different methodology, at
subsonic speeds a cruise missile will approximately consume
fuel in proportion to its weight and inversely proportional
to its lift-to-drag ratio. Therefore, the fuel it will




where SFC is the amount of fuel per hour of operation per
pound of engine thrust the missile requires. Integrating
over time (II-l) becomes
Mfuel
=
E7T x ( SF« x T f 11
" 2 )
where M is the weight, but if the range of the missile is
R and its velocity V
T = R/V (II-3)
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Substituting (II -3) into (II - 2) and rearranging the
equation we have 17
Mfuel
=
R x (SFC) fII ,,W~—— L/D x V Ui 4J
missile
For a missile of L/D = 10, V = 0.8 Mach and SFC = 1 pound
of fuel per pound of engine thrust per hour
fuel
.
R x 1 rTT ,->,
M . ., ' 10 x 691 u bJ
missile
Mfuel -4
u =1.4x10 xR (H-6)
missile
For the projected missile and fuel weights
(1.4 x 10" 4 x 2.9 x 10 3 Km) = .4
yielding an 1800-mile range capability. Fuel required to
climb to cruise altitude must be subtracted from the total
fuel weight, but that still makes the missile a very
capable weapons platform.





Analyzing the data presented, it is reasonable
to assume that the Soviets could modify the SS-N-3 missile
and attain potential range capabilities that could enable
them to strike most of the countervalue targets in the
United States.
b. Missile Guidance Asymmetries
The U.S. requires longer missile ranges to
attain a countervalue strike capability. Long-range
missiles require a more elaborate guidance system to
monitor and resolve accumulated track errors. Until
recently, available electronics technology did not provide
the means to direct long-range missiles with precision
guidance. Recent advances in large-scale integration of
microcircuits have made possible an entirely new set of micro
miniatured electronic devices. These developments have made
possible the construction of guidance systems for long-range
self-guided missiles with ranges that are now independent
of guidance considerations.
Large-array microcircuits are electronic circuits
fabricated on very thin substrates that contain on a few
square centimeters the equivalent of many thousands of
electronic logic circuits. Densities of a million devices
(such as a photo-sensitive diode or a bipolar transistor)
per square centimeter of substrate material that is 250
microns thick, are commonly achieved. Allowing for
airspace, it is conceivable that a device can be built
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othat can store 10 bits of serially read-out information
per cubic centimeter of electronic memory. 18
The guidance and control of a missile requires
many logic circuits and memory banks. The development of
large-scale integration (LSI) has enabled practical realiza-
tion of a navigation system which uses a new method for the
accurate delivery of weapons over long ranges. This guidance
principle, based on terrain matching and recognition, is
known as Tercom. 19
Tercom operates on the principle that the
geographic location of any place on the earth is uniquely
defined by vertical contours, or topography, of the
surrounding area. Tercom requires previous mapping or
other determination of the terrain contour characteristics
for the area over which missiles are intended to fly. 20
Terrain contour data for an area over which a particular
mission is to be flown are stored in the missile's Tercom
computer. During an operational mission the Tercom system
measures the vertical contour of the terrain along its
flight path, using a radar or laser altimeter to measure
clearance above the terrain and a barometric altimeter
to provide a reference. By comparing the two altitude
18 Tsipis, K., "The Long Range Cruise Missile," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists
,
v. 31, p. 17, April 1975.
19 Klass, P. J., "New Guidance Techniques Being Tested,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology
,




readings, one relative and one absolute, a single terrain
evaluation is determined. Repeated measurements define the
sequence of contours beneath the flight path. Comparison
is then made with stored contours, of known coordinates, to
determine that which closely matches the measured one. This
procedure fixes the missile position relative to the coordi-
nate system and can be used to update the missile's inertial
system.
While the theory of Tercom is simple, the success-
ful realization of a system is far more difficult. One of
the key parameters for successful design involves considering
the granularity, or resolution, with which the system attempts
to measure and compare vertical profiles . This is called
"cell size." 21 Another is the number of cell-size samples
that are used at one time to establish the terrain contour
along the vehicle flight path. The greater the number of
samples, the more accurate the profile. But this
increases the required computer capacity and time needed
to search for a matching profile in memory.
For the system being currently developed, a
match is sought between the measured contour and pre-stored
ones, first behind and ahead of the missile's calculated
position along the expected flight path. If this compari-
son fails, comparison is made with 4.9 mile-long contours





both to the left and to the right of the vehicle's flight
paths, both behind and ahead of estimated position. 22 The
extensive data comparison requires sophisticated computa-
tional facilities. Thus, actualization of Tercom requires
light-weight, low-cost, high-capacity computers made
possible by LSI.
In addition to the Tercom system the vehicle
needs to carry another navigation system, either inertial,
Doppler or simple air-speed-heading type.
When Tercom has found the closest contour match
and fixed the vehicle's position, this information is used
to update the associated navigation system. Because Tercom
operates by sensing and comparing terrain profile, it
cannot be used to obtain position fixes over the ocean,
large bodies of water, or marsh lands. The LRCM can use
its conventional navigation system for guidance until it
reaches landfall. This suggests the use of an inertial
system. At landfall Tercom can update the inertial system.
Periodic fixes and updates during the remainder of the
mission produce high accuracy with a modest inertial system.
The accuracy demands imposed on the Tercom radar
altimeter are not excessive, especially in terms of absolute
accuracy, because the need is to measure the vertical profile
of the terrain below rather than its absolute height relative
2 2
Klass, op. cit., p. 49.
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to the vehicle. Typically, Tercom needs to determine the
terrain elevation only to an accuracy of several feet. 23
Tercom performs most accurately when used in low-altitude
flight, because the topographical contour can be measured
more precisely. At higher altitudes, due in part to the beam
width of the radar altimeter, there tends to be more aver-
aging of the measured contour.
For the proposed LRCM, terminal guidance is
performed with a passive radiometer. This device probably
senses terrain reflectivity at one or more wave lengths to
produce a form of image of the target area. Guidance is
then accomplished by an image correlation technique. The
combination of Tercom-aided inertial guidance and pattern-
recognition terminal guidance permits accuracies under
30 meters at 1,500 NM ranges. 2tf Both Tercom and terrain-
recognition terminal guidance cannot be jammed effectively
or inexpensively by electronic countermeasures . Although one
could imagine methods for jamming the terminal guidance of
the missile, they would be so costly and elaborate that
they are not considered realistic. 25
In summary the U.S. requires long missile
ranges to attain a counterforce and countervalue strike
23 Klass, op. cit.
, p. 49.
2tf Tsipis, op. cit., p. 13.
2 5 Tsipis, op. cit.
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capability against the Soviet Union. The development of
Tercom should provide accuracies far better than those
attained by a preprogrammed autopilot guidance system in
a missile operating over a 500-600 NM flight track.
Equivalent Soviet countervalue strike
capabilities may be obtained with one half the missile range
required by the U.S. since major U.S. cities and industrial
areas are predominantly concentrated along the coastal
regions. For many countervalue purposes, missile accuracies
are less critical. Hence, less complex missile guidance
systems are needed by the Soviets to gain similar counter-
value probability of kill results. According to Janes 26
the SS-N-3 missile employs a preprogrammed autopilot guidance
system and has a 5 50 NM range.
Guidance system improvements would probably be
required should the Soviets upgrade the engine to state-of-
the-art technology and more than double the present range.
Upgrading the present SS-N-3 guidance with a
gyro-stabilized inertial system could probably provide
increased capability. An inertial system detects errors
in the desired flight path by measuring the lateral and
longitudinal accelerations during missile flight. Acceler-
ometers detect missile velocity changes without the need
of an external reference. The acceleration signals are
2 6 See Appendix A for table.
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fed to a simple computer which produces distance traveled
indications. A gyro-stabilized platform is interfaced with
the inertial system to detect errors in the pitch, roll,
and yaw axis. Such systems have been developed for ballistic
missiles which allow accuracies of fractions of a mile at
intercontinental ranges. A similar level of technology
could probably support accuracies of a few hundred feet
at ranges of 1500 miles. Soviet inertial guidance technol-
ogy gained through ICBM development is probably readily
available for installation in the SS-N-3. Interfacing a
basic Doppler navigation system with the inertial guidance
could supply a backup system and provide the Soviets with
a highly reliable countervalue capable missile with com-
parable functional capability to the proposed LRCM.
A composite guidance system employing a
combination of sensors would also be a possible alternative
for the SS-N-3. Long Range Navigation (LORAN) or radio
beacon (commercial or navigation aids) homing techniques
could be employed and extremely small CEPs gained. LORAN
and radio beacon navigation aids are readily available
along both U.S. coasts. Redundant coverage is available
in most areas. An automatic LORAN receiver preset to a
line of constant time difference (from a simultaneous
pulsed station-pair) which crosses an intended target
area could furnish accurate guidance information to the
missile navigation system. Automatic direction finding
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(ADF) receivers tuned to radio beacon frequencies could
also yield very accurate navigation information. All
major population centers have commercial radio stations
and by employing terminal bearing measurement techniques,
very accurate countervalue strike capabilities can
probably be attained. OMNI and TACAN navigation systems
captured in downed U.S. aircraft in Southeast Asia have
probably been analyzed and duplicated by the Soviets.
Installing either one of these systems in the SS-N-3 could
provide a terminal precision navigation capability. Com-
bining an inertial system with one or two of the afore-
mentioned radio navigation aids through a matrix switch
could provide a very accurate navigation system for the
SS-N-3. Admittedly our navigation aids may be turned off
during a national emergency so the Soviets could not
utilize them. However, any crisis which resulted in the
use of nuclear weapons against countervalue targets would
probably be initiated by surprise by the Soviets and our
navigation aids would be operational.
Soviet micro-miniaturization of electronic
components technology is estimated to be five to ten years
behind the U.S. 27 That factor does not mean that it will
take the Soviets ten years to build and deploy a modified
27 Robinson, C. A., "Single Cruise Missile Set for
Varied Use," Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
v. 102,
p. 19, 24 February 1975.
44

SS-N-3 missile with a guidance system similar to Tercom.
The SS-N-3 missile is more than twice the size of the U.S.
LRCM (42 feet versus 20.5 feet); hence to obtain similar
guidance technique capabilities, Soviet miniaturization
technology does not require the refinement obtained by the
U.S. to attain the same capability.
Employing a Tercom type system in the SS-N-3
missile would probably not be cost-effective for the
Soviets. Effective countervalue strikes can be obtained
without employing this state-of-the-art technology. Should
the Soviets upgrade the missile engine with more recent
turbofan technology and attain projected ranges of approxi-
mately 1500 NM, any combination of the guidance systems
discussed would probably furnish effective countervalue
strike capabilities to these ranges. However, since
approximately 501 of U.S. population is concentrated within
150 NM of the coasts, unacceptable damage can be inflicted
without increasing the range or guidance accuracy of the
SS-N-3 missile. Soviet air-surface cruise missiles carried
by long-range refuelable aircraft have similar capabilities
and should be considered as an equally serious threat.
See Appendix A for Soviet air-surface cruise missiles, their




1. Strategic Targeting Asymme tries
The fundamental elements of nuclear strategy can
probably be reduced to an analysis of the interaction
between alternative targeting options and alternative
capabilities for threatening, destroying or protecting
those targets. This applies to highly elaborate deterrence
or war-fighting strategies based on possession of a wide
variety of nuclear weapons with different performance
characteristics or, alternatively, to very simple strategies
based upon the ability to deliver one nuclear weapon one
one city with a simple strategic weapon like a long-range
cruise missile. An analysis of basic strategic targets is
important because recent developments in weapons accuracies
at both the tactical and strategic levels have enhanced the
importance of identifying and classifying specific targets
into categories according to their susceptability of being
attacked by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and
bombers. The primary advantage of accurate weapons systems
is that they can be used with fairly low yields against
selected targets in populated areas while minimizing
collateral damage to civilian populations. The proposed
U.S. LRCM will have this potential capability to strike
non-time sensitive targets. The ability to target precisely
a whole array of industrial, as well as military targets
with different types of weapons enables flexibility in
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obtaining foreign policy objectives and provides the decision
maker with the necessary decision space to obtain those
objectives
.
Targets can be categorized as counterforce and
countervalue targets. Counterforce targets have military
significance, usually associated with forces or installa-
tions, and countervalue targets are usually major popula-
tion and industrial centers. Counterforce targets include:
hardened ICBM silos; bombers and their bases; ICBMs not in
hardened silos; submarines in port; air defense and ABM
systems; command and control centers; nuclear stockpiles;
nuclear production facilities; military bases and staging
areas; and ammunition and fuel dumps.
Countervalue targets include: population centers;
industrial structures and facilities; raw materials and
energy production; missile and aircraft factories; gaseous
diffusion plants; and transportation and communications
facilities
The aggregate size of a country's population has
important military and strategic implications. Population
distribution and composition are also important in terms of
strategic nuclear warfare. Population distribution indi-
cates what percentage of the nation resides in urban and
rural areas, and which urban and rural areas are the most
densely populated. Industry is usually collocated near urban
centers making these targets high on the countervalue target
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list. Facilities associated with the production, refining
and distribution of petroleum, natural gas and coal; and
hydro-electric, thermal and atomic power stations and
transmission networks are also high economic value targets.
For various historical, economic and political
reasons the Soviet Union is a nation with a great many large
high-density cities. According to the 1970 census she had
201 cities of over 100,000 people 28 as compared to the U.S.
which has 216 cities over 100,000 inhabitants and, despite
her large goegraphic area, the majority of the population
is located in less than a quarter of the country's total
area. According to the 1970 census, the Soviet Union has
250.9 million people and approximately 56 per cent are
classified as urban dwellers. Of this urban population,
approximately 70 per cent are in European Russia, west of
the Urals. Approximately 35 per cent of the total Soviet
population and 60 per cent of the urban population, resides
in 310 cities with populations in excess of 50,000. While
it is important to know the total size and composition of
Soviet population and industry, it is also important to know
their distribution throughout the country and, from the point
of view of targeting specific areas, to have some indication
of the population density of various metropolitan areas.
Appendix B lists all Soviet cities with populations over
2 8 See Appendices B and C.
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100,000, their density, area covered, and potential warhead
requirements
.
The geographic location of the major cities is a
vital vector when considering targeting alternative weapons
systems having different ranges or launched from different
firing positions. The most heavily urbanized regions (by
percentage of population living in large cities) are, in
this order: Northwest, Central, Western Siberia, Donets-
Dnepr, and Urals and Volga. 29
The most salient targeting asymmetry is the distance
from reasonably secure weapon launch positions to counter-
force and countervalue targets. Approximately 50 per cent
of the U.S. population is concentrated in cities greater
than 100,000 inhabitants within 350 NM of the coasts 30
(within range of the present SS-N-3) as compared to
the Soviet Union where the easternmost major city,
Leningrad, is roughly 1000 NM from a reasonably secure
launch position; assuming a 200 NM buffer launch zone to
avoid coastal surface anti-submarine warfare efforts and
extended Soviet air defense along the North and Berents Sea
coast areas. Long-range cruise missiles may not have the
range to strike all counterforce and countervalue targets,
but are capable of striking a significantly large proportion
to make it a formidably capable strategic weapon system.
29 Harris, CD., Cities of the Soviet Union
,
Rand
McNally, p. 16, 1970.
30 See Appendix D.
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Sufficient numbers of SS-N-3s launched from E-II
submarines, surfaced 200 NM off either coast, could inflict
significant damage to U.S. counterforce and countervalue
targets. Counterforce targets within the range of the
SS-N-3 include: submarines in port; submarine missile
storage areas; bomber bases within range of the coast;
nuclear power plants; national command center, i.e.,
President and his staff; naval bases; military bases and
staging areas; airfields; ammunition and fuel dumps; and
air defense systems. Countervalue targets include: indus-
trial structures and facilities; population centers; missile
and aircraft factories; gaseous diffusion plants; transporta-
tion and communications facilities; plus many additional
facilities too numerous to mention. The U.S. forward base
system (FBS) is very vulnerable to attack by submarine
launched, surface launched, and air launched cruise missiles
The SS-N-3 launched from the KYNDA cruiser has a range
capability of 250 NM, the AS-6 launched from the "BADGER
Modified" and possibly BACKFIRE bombers is assessed as
having a 300 NM range capability, and the modified AS-4
launched from the BACKFIRE B is assessed as having a 425 NM
range capability. 31 Expanding world-wide Soviet naval
exercises demonstrate the increased emphasis the Soviets
are placing on naval power, enhancing their capability to
3 1 See Appendix A.
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strike the U.S. FBS. The only major counterforce targets
the SS-N-3 would not be capable of striking are ICBM silos
and bombers and their bases deployed inland from the
coastal areas. Combining the overwhelming number of vulnera-
ble targets with the lack of air defense capability to detect
low-flying targets, the SS-N-3 missile, if used in a strategic
mode, poses a very serious threat to the United States.
Soviet air-surface cruise missiles carried on long-range
bombers have similar capabilities and should be considered
as an equally serious threat.
United States cruise missile targeting problems are
much more complex than those of the Soviets due to geographi-
cal differences. Increased range is required to strike most
targets. Coastal counterforce targets, for the most part,
are nearly 1000 NM from safe launching zones. Limited
numbers of counterforce targets like Northern and Pacific
Fleet naval installations and early warning facilities can
be targeted at ranges less than 1000 NM. Most countervalue
targets are located at ranges from 1000 to 2000 NM from
safe launch zones. 32
Soviet major cities are more dense than U.S. cities,
but only 10 major cities have populations greater than one
million as compared to the U.S. which has 33 cities with
populations greater than one million. On balance, the
32 Kemp, G. , "Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part I,




Soviet Union is more rural than the United States. Thirty
per cent of the Russian people live in cities having popu-
lations greater than 100,000 inhabitants as compared to the
U.S. where 64% of the total population live in cities
having more than 100,000 inhabitants. From this data it is
obvious that the Soviets have a relatively simple potential
targeting problem as compared to the U.S. which must possess
longer range missiles having more highly accurate guidance
systems. Since the Soviet Union is more rural and the
urban areas much smaller than the U.S. it is evident that
potential targeting for casualties greater than 25% of the
population would require increasingly larger numbers of
weapons
.
The Soviet Union could potentially inflict 50 million
casualties (25% of the U.S. population) by striking approxi-
mately 70 cities within 350 NM of the coast with about 150
one-MT warheads. 33 To account for failures due to launch,
guidance, warheads, etc., and considering the Soviets' policy
of using large numbers of weapons, the Soviets could probably
dedicate a minimum of 200 one-MT warheads to inflict that
potential damage (see Table XII). The Soviets have 280
SS-N-3 missiles deployed on ECHO-II and JULIET submarines
and an additional number of air-surface cruise missiles,
having ranges from approximately 300 to 400 NM deployed
3 3 See Appendix E.
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on the BEAR B and C and BADGER MODIFIED which could be
deployed against the U.S. 3 " Assuming the Soviets upgrade
the SS-N-3 engine, guidance and warhead to a one-MT weapon,
these weapons alone could inflict unacceptable damage on
the United States.
2. Air Defense Asymmetries
The LRCM poses a challenge to present early warning
systems and air defense forces in both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. The total air defense capability of the U.S.S.R.
is enormous --far in excess of that of any other country.
Detailed information on the Russian air defense systems is
not readily available in open-source literature; however,
it is estimated that the U.S.S.R has around 10,000 surface-
to-air missile launchers and thousands of air defense
radars to go with them. 35 In addition to an effective
early warning detection system, the Soviets have an exten-
sive fighter- interceptor capability to defend their coastal
territory from penetrating aircraft. The U.S. does not
possess the numbers of early warning detection systems,
surface-to-air missile launchers and fighter-interceptors
possessed by the U.S.S.R. Consequently, the probability
of detection and destruction of large numbers of similar
airborne targets is lower in the U.S. than in the U.S.S.R.
3
''See Appendix A.
3S Pretty and Archer, op. cit., p. 219.
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The LRCM will pose a unique problem for the Soviet
defense system. Radar cross-section reduction efforts
have decreased the U.S. LRCM radar return to the size of a
seagull and using radar absorption material, it is being
attempted to decrease the radar cross-section down to the
size of a sparrow. 36 Current air defense radars are prob-
ably not capable of detecting and tracking such targets.
New radars or other types of sensors capable of operating
against a low-altitude small radar cross-section target
will probably have to be developed. Clutter problems
experienced at low grazing angles create signal processing
difficulties, making low level target detection and tracking
extremely complex. Similar problems are encountered in
designing low altitude surface-to-air missile guidance
systems.
3. Asymmetries in Essential Equivalence
The objective of essential equivalence is based on
the desire to match Soviet counterforce and countervalue
capability and prevent the Soviet Union from attaining
meaningful numerical superiority in strategic forces, namely
numbers of delivery vehicles, types of delivery vehicles,
numbers of deliverable warheads and total deliverable mega-
tonnage (throw weight) . Strategic weapons programs can
be said to demonstrate technological pre-eminence, a





determination not to relinquish the initiative on the stage
of world politics, and continued American resolve in the
pursuit of our various foreign policy objectives. Essential
equivalence is also viewed as an intention to reduce the
likelihood of confrontation and crisis by dissuading Soviet
leaders from believing that their superiority in nuclear
weaponry is exploitable diplomatically or militarily.
When the SALT I agreement was signed in May, 19 72,
one of the principal criticisms of the accords was the great
disparity in throw weight between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
ICBM's. This lack of equivalence was feared to provide
the Soviets with a potential first strike capability against
U.S. land-based strategic forces in the long term. Opera-
tional U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and their charac-
teristics in May, 1972, are presented in Table II.
Strategic missile forces deployed by the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. in July, 1975, are presented in Table III.
In addition to state-of-the-art ballistic missiles,
the Soviets have cruise missiles deployed on submarine,
surface and airborne platforms. 37 Deploying cruise missile
launch platforms to politically sensitive areas enables the
Soviets to demonstrate resolve and enhance their foreign
policy objectives. Nuclear warhead yields carried by Soviet
long-range cruise missiles are small compared to "total"




Operational U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile
Forces, May 1972 38
Soviet Ballistic Missiles
No . o £
System Throw Weight (lbs) Warhea ds Yield
SS-7 3000-4000 1 5MT









SS-13 1000 1 1MT
SS-N-4 1500 1 1-2MT
SS-N-5 1500 1 1-2MT


















38 Schneider, M. , MSALT and The Strategic Balance, 1974,"





Strategic Missile Forces Deployed














SS-9 20-25 (1) 1 288 7200
SS-11
SS-13 1-2 (1) 1 970 1940
SS-13 1 (1) 1 60 60
SS-N-6 1 (1- 2) 1 528 528
SS-N-8 1 (1- 2) 1 80 80
SS-7
SS-8 5 (1. 5) 1 209 1045
TOTALS 2075 10,853
U.S. Missiles
MM-III .16 .2 3 550 264
MM- 1
1
1 .3 1 450 450
TITAN 5 .5 1 54 270
POLARIS .05 .3 10 496 248
POSEIDON .20 .5 3 160 96
TOTALS 1710 1328
Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimates.
39 Estimated warhead yields, re-entry vehicles and no.




""CEP data obtained from Tsipis, K. , "The Accuracy of
Strategic Missiles," Scientific America
,
v. 233, p. 21, July
1975. Many observers teel that the Soviet missiles have




ballistic missile throw weight yields, but utilizing these
missiles as a threat against third-world countries and as
a secondary weapon against U.S. or allied targets makes the
cruise missile a formidable weapons system which must be
considered in the strategic arena. The Soviets have been
developing a cruise missile capability since 1958 and
recent open-source literature indicates that the Soviets
are developing a new submarine -launched nuclear tipped cruise
missile and a new air-launched nuclear tipped missile. 1* 1
The Soviets presently have SS-N-3 SHADDOCK cruise
missiles deployed aboard ECHO II, JULIET, and older WHISKEY
submarines; and KYNDA and KRESTA I cruisers. k2 Twenty-
seven ECHO- II and 16 JULIET submarines can carry 280 cruise
missiles (see Table IV) . The SS-N-3 missile has been
operational since 1961-62. This missile has a current
range of about 550 NM, with a capability to probably double
that range by making relatively simple propulsion and
operational changes.
^
3 The SS-N-3 reconfigured could prob-
ably fly a trajectory that would enable it to strike cities
in the Midwest. ^ The Soviets have been operating ECHO- II
"See Appendix A.
112 Ibid .
^Hotz, R., "Pitfalls of SALT-II," Aviation Week and
Space Technology
,
v. 103, p. 9, 15 December 19 75.
^"Soviets Press Sub Operations at Cuba," Aviation Week
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class submarines in Cuban waters probably as part of a
political-military probe of U.S. resolve. lf8
The Soviets have a submarine facility in Cienfuegas
Harbor and maintain a submarine rescue vessel from other
ports in Cuba. 1* 9 The first ECHO-II submarines called at
the port of Ant ilia from May 2 7 through June 4, 19 71 and
were accompanied by a tender. 50 Since that time, five other
ECHO-class submarines have called at Havana and Cienfuegos
.
5 1
Since 1969, a total of about 30 Soviet submarines have
called at Cuban ports. 52 These demonstrated cruise missile
submarine operations from Cuban ports indicate the Soviets'
capability and possible intentions to utilize these forward
based facilities to obtain foreign policy objectives. These
Soviet objectives could possibly include an attack on U.S.
cities following a pre-emptive first-strike by ICBMs and
SLBMs . Soviet air-launched cruise missiles pose a similar
threat and should be included with submarine launch cruise
missiles when equating U.S. and Soviet forces essential
equivalence.
The major portion of the U.S. strategic megatonnage
is deployed in the strategic bomber, compared to the Soviets












who have their major portion deployed in strategic missiles.
Soviet bombers carry only one-fifth the megatonnage U.S.
bombers carry (see Table V) , making their bomber force
strategically less critical and their throw weight potential
less vulnerable to attack.
Soviet ballistic missiles carry eight times as much
megatonnage as U.S. ballistic missiles (see Table VI),
resulting in a significant asymmetry.
The SALT accords granted the Soviets 1,618 ICBM's
compared to 1,054 for the U.S. The Soviets were granted
740 SLBM's with the option to build up to 950 in exchange
for 210 of their older ICBM's. The United States was
limited to 656 SLBM's with an option to build up to 710
in exchange for 54 TITAN II ICBM's. 53 The throw weight
implicitly allowed the Soviet Union was reportedly four times
that of the United States. Proponents of the SAL I accords
argued that the Soviet advantages in numbers and throw weight
were compensated by U.S. advantages in number of warheads,
missile accuracy, numbers of bombers and tactical aircraft
in Europe. However, the Soviets had 650 medium bombers
and approximately 700 medium or intermediate-range ballistic
missiles the U.S. was not counting since they do not pose
a threat to the continental U.S. However, they are a
threat to our European allies.
53 The interim agreement and protocol signed at Moscow
May 26, 1972, with agreed interpretations, common under-
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Miss iles /Plat forms
Total
Weight (MT)
Ballistic Missiles 2075 10,853





















Many of the assumptions upon which the Interim
Agreement was based were proved faulty within six months of
the signing. The Soviets proceeded developing a new family
of ICBM's having improved accuracy and greater throw weight.
The Soviets tested the SS-11 with a 2500-pound throw weight
and three warheads -MRV s. The SS-N-8, assumed capable of
throwing a 1500-pound payload about 2500 NM, was actually
tested over 4,000 NM. By May 1974, the Soviets had four
new ICBM's in an advanced testing stage. Three systems
were considered large missiles. The SS-17 and SS-19 have
three to five times the throw weight of the older SS-11.
The SS-18 throw weight is thirty per cent greater than the
SS-9, their largest deployed ICBM. 57 It should be noted
that the SS-9 throw weight is already about ten times the
payload of the U.S. MINUTEMAN ICBM. The SS-17 and SS-19
re-entry vehicles have a better accuracy than the older
Soviet systems listed in Table III.
The SS-17 has been tested with four warheads and
the SS-19 with six. The SS-18 has been tested with five to
eight relatively large warheads. The SS-17 and SS-18 have
also been tested with single RVs of very large size. The
SS-18 is assed to have a hard target kill capability in
its MIRV Version. The SS-17 already has such a capability
57 Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979
Defense Program, March 4, 1974, p. 45-47. (Henceforth known
as 1974 Posture Statement.)
64

in its single warhead variant. It is expected that the
SS-17 and SS-18 MIRV systems will achieve the accuracy
needed to destroy hard targets. 58 When these new missiles
are fully deployed, the Soviet ICBM force alone will carry
7000 to 8000 MIRVs with an average yield of one to two
megatons. This is more than the combined U.S. ICBM force
and SLBM force in terms of numbers of RVs and with six to
twelve times the yield of the largest U.S. MIRV. 59 The
most impressive feature of the new family of Soviet missiles
is the potential for approximately tripling the already
massive throw weight capability of the 1972 Soviet ICBM
force. This emerging throw weight expansion coupled with
an estimate of 500 to 700 meters CEP accuracy led Defense
Secretary Schlesinger to conclude that the Soviet strategic
weapons buildup will pose a substantial first-strike threat
to hardened U.S. land-based ICBMs by the mid-1980s. 60
Killing counterforce hard targets like ICBMs
requires missiles that are capable of delivering warheads
with great accuracy. "It is this feature of the new Soviet
ICBM program which, with multiple high-yield warheads,
translates into a potential hard target capability,
58 1974 Posture Statement, p. 45-46.
59 Ibid.
60 Simmons, H. , "SALT II Problems and Prospects,"
International Defense Review, p. 2, August 19 75.
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unmatched by the U.S.," according to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld. "As the Soviets proceed with their expected
ICBM deployment and continued improvements in accuracy,
the combination of increased throw weight, MIRVing and
improving accuracy will increasingly threaten the surviva-
bility of the fix-based MINUTEMAN force." 61
This potential asymmetry was discussed in recent
congressional hearings. "The U.S. currently has deployed
1,054 MINUTEMAN and TITAN ICBM silos. In a hypothetical
counterforce attack the Soviets, using only their heavy
ICBM missile force (i.e., 308 MIRVed SS-18s), could target
two RV's to each U.S. silo. The effectiveness of the attack
would depend on the hardness of the U.S. silos and the
accuracy of the Soviet missiles. Assuming hardness values
consistent with the upgraded MINUTEMAN silos, the following
results could be expected:
Percent of
Soviet CEP (NM) U.S. silos destroyed
.25- - - - - - 59
.20 83
.15- - - - - 95
.10 98
The heavy missile force is considered destabilizing since,
as shown above, it has the potential of placing at risk
6 Robinson, C. A., "Soviets Make New SALT Bid,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
v. 104, p. 14,
2 February 19 76.
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a large portion of the U.S. silo-based force while allowing
the Soviets to retain all of their SS-11, SS-16, SS-17,
and SS-19 ICBMs in tact. This residual capability represents
approximately two and one-half times the total throw-weight-
potential of the U.S. ICBM force before the attack." 62
Increasing re-entry vehicle accuracies will greatly
increase their weapon lethality capability. Lethality of a
weapon against a hardened counterforce target is a function
of the warhead's yield and accuracy. Counterforce lethality
can be expressed as follows: 63
Y 2/3
CMP = — T n
(CEP) Z
where counter military potential (CMP) is an expression
of the lethality, Y is the yield in MT, CEP is the
accuracy in NM and n is the number of warheads. By in-
spection it is evident that as the CEP is decreased, the
lethality is increased and the probability that the warhead
can destroy a hard target is increased. Lethality increases
much more rapidly with an improvement in accuracy than with
an increase in yield.
62Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session,
Overall National Security Programs and Related Budget Require-
ments, December 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1975,
p. 247. (Henceforth known as Congressional Security Hearings.)
63 See Appendix E.
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Equivalent meg atonnage (EMT) is an expression of a
country's countervalue force potential. EMT can be ex-
pressed as follows : 61f
EMT = Y 2/3n
where Y is the yield and n is the number of warheads.
Unlike CMP, the warhead accuracy is not a factor in deter-
mining the equivalent megatonnage; because accuracy is not
critical when striking countervalue targets. Large yields
increase a country's EMT. Yield times the number of
warheads in a country's force provides a measure of the
potential countervalue capability.
It is plausible that the Soviet Union and the
United States may deploy ballistic and cruise missiles in
numbers as listed in Tables VII, VIII, and IX. Open-source
literature indicates that Soviet Design Bureaus remain
functional as a unit after weapon models reach the produc-
tion stage. These bureaus then start developing a follow-
on weapon system. Considering this design philosophy,
it is reasonable to assume that a new follow-on naval
ballistic missile will be developed. It is also reasonable
to assume that missile accuracies will approach those
listed in the Congressional hearings. 65
6 t
See Appendix E.



















o a> o <zt
OO en CM rH
o to cr> OO
* * m>
LO OO CT> 00
CM O CM rH
O O vO CM
lo lo en t-i









o o o OO t^ LO
OO O vO o oo toONH O f- CM
CM C~» CM pH cm LO
"<* 1^ rH to
rH CM «*
O O O CM ON O >* U1C7>








o t> vO to to
<H 7) • • •
H •H LO CM O O





CM O O CM
• • • •





> to > to O O O





E- P CM CNI O O
7) cu • • • •
•H S LO lo O vO





7) cw CM r-a CM <vj
— cu O o o o





T* -3- ^- * "tf-




•H Oh lo LO LO LO
75 w rH rH rH rH




u> O o LO LO






rH H Q 2
•H rH HW
7) H W Q
7) 1 CO rH
•H 3g XO Oil2 IS^H
O tO rH rH tO
«* «s- o o -^t-
«^- CM ^ «5f **•





rH rH LO LO rH
to
vO 00
00 (T> l I <n
rH ih z z^
i i i i o
CO CO CO CO CL,
















































• < *-> rHp CD crj •
s r* 00 rt CD
CD O aj o rH
s P H •H •H
>^ 7) P 7) 7)
o O CO 7) 7)
rH > CD •H
a, •H rl ?H 2





to > CD u • >
fi P P crj
o <D 3 s •H 2
a. pC p o U
CtJ rH -H u fi
<d r p m • O
£ 7) cu i
* C! T) • • o 5
CD • r—
f
CD TJ T3 o
rH 2 P CD CD A rH
_Q rH CTJ P p 7) rH
•H •» crj rH CTJ crj fi O
7) p rt 3 s S o m
3 X! O P •H •H i
crj U -H 71 P P s 5
rH aj p O 7) 7) •H CD
Qh 2 ccj a. w m CO 2










o •rt t^. CM
vO to C7> to CM
LO lo O n- CM
o o O CM 00 o
o «* «vf LO 00 CM




























O O O CM
CM O «=t LO










w o • enJ •H D —
PQ P > to o o o










o> ^- «3- *d- «d-
rH CM to to rH i—
i








C/) T-i o o LO LO
V) O H CM CM o o


















(/> rH W P
to 1 CO rH
H 2 X o a:2 S s O* H
vO OO





CO CO CO CO tL,














































































































































LO Pk n rH







o • P z
Pu PU •H
as o O CO
o CO
f» 2 A •
C^ r—
1
cu • • a3
rH a> P<5 o "d T3
rH PL, <D <D OO
JO HH #\ P P PS
•H CO CO aJ rt •H
CO •H £ S s
3 LO fin •H •H 3
PJ crj r-- •H P P CO
o rH a* CO CO CO CO
1 PLj rH E-> pq pq <M ^ CO j- u> (O t>- CO





















































































Postulated U.S. and U.S.S.R. ballistic missile
deployment, as listed in Tables VII and VIII, would gain
the Soviets a three-to-one advantage over the United
States in both counterforce and countervalue potential.
Deploying the SLC.M, as listed in Table IX, would






1. Theory of MAD
It is difficult to overemphasize the psychological
aspect of deterrence. J. D. Singer 79 and the American
behaviorist school define the perception of a threat as
the product of the estimated capability of the opponent's
forces multiplied by the estimated probability that he will
use them. If there is no apparent intention to use force,
even when a formidable force is available, there obviously
is no threat. This century has seen startling changes in
the relative strengths of offense and defense. World
War II demonstrated the superiority of the defense overcome
by using armor and close air-support aircraft. Carrier
strike forces sank enemy fleets right in their own harbors,
and amphibious forces successfully assaulted strongly
defended coasts, while bombers inflicted heavy punishment
on cities. Strategic offense matured in the 1950 ? s and
1960's as nuclear weapons were further improved and long-
range ballistic missiles were developed. Today a country
contemplating an attack against another opponent which
is armed with modern strategic offensive weapons is probably
79 Singer, J. D., "Threat Perception and the Armament-
Tension Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution
,
v. 2,
p. 90-105, February 1958.
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less concerned with the success of his own offense than
with the potential capabilities of the adversary's offense.
Here lies the crux of deterrence, the fear of the opponent's
retaliation.
Deterrence can be considered a concept of foreign
policy management that merges our force planning and employ-
ment considerations and fosters barriers to escalation,
while affording rational alternatives at ever-lessening
levels of conflict.
The dominant deterrence concept in contemporary
strategic thought has been "mutual assured destruction"
(MAD) . The imperatives of the MAD concept have played an
important role in our force planning assumptions, the
design of our nuclear and. conventional armed forces and in
our arms control negotiations. We began to rely primarily
on the ability to inflict damage, or "assured destruction,"
on the U.S.S.R. with our bomber force, and later our missile
force, in order to deter the initiation of nuclear war
or other large-scale aggression and thereby obtain "optimum"
damage limitation. As Soviet nuclear forces became stronger,
the mutuality of deterrence through assured destruction
became more apparent. Deterrence through assured destruc-
tion as a U.S. policy was developed and promoted during the





The MAD concept as implemented consists of a triad
of sufficient strategic nuclear delivery forces (land-
based ICBM's, submarine -launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's),
and long-range heavy bombers) to inflict unacceptable
damage on an aggressor, even after absorbing a counterforce
first-strike from the aggressor. 80 "Unacceptable damage"
has been generally defined for computational and explana-
tory purposes as substantial damage to industrial capacity
(e.g., 25 per cent destruction from blast effects alone),
and substantial urban population deaths (e.g., the prompt
death of one-fourth to one-third of all urban population). 81
Fear of other nuclear effects, both physical (fallout) and
psychological (mass hysteria) , is presumed to contribute
to deterrence. MAD relies on each side believing that
such substantial damage to manufacturing plants and the
death of many millions of people would destroy the viability
of a nation as a modern society, and that recognition of
these circumstances would deter the decision maker on each
side from initiating any nuclear strike.
80 Kahan, J. H. , "Stable Deterrence: A Strategic Policy
for the 1970's," ORBIS
, v. 15, p. 528-543, Summer, 1971.
8 Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara before a
Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations
on the Fiscal Year 1968-1972 Defense Program and 1968




2. Scales and Theory of Counterforce
The MAD concept has resulted in a relatively stable
deterrence strategy for the past 20 years. However, during
recent years there has evolved a widespread and deep-seated
dissatisfaction with many of the fundamental premises
underlying American strategic weapons policy. This dis-
satisfaction has originated in part from disappointment
with the terms of the arms -control agreements concluded
between the United States and the Soviet Union at the
Moscow summit meeting in May, 1972. The Interim Agreement
on Strategic Offensive Weapons is faulted for conceding
numerical superiority to the Soviet Union. It also stems
from the vigorous strategic weapons programs the Soviets are
undertaking. This discontentment has provided the context
for a new debate over the size and structure of the nation's
nuclear forces.
In news conferences on 10 and 24 January 19 74 and
in testimony before Congressional committees, 82 Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger announced changes in the plans
for U.S. strategic forces. These plans contain the intent
of the United States to develop a much wider range of
strategic options than were available in the past, and the
intent to maintain rough symmetry in counterforce capabilities
82The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Survival, "Flexible Strategic Options and Deterrence,"
v. 16, p. 86-90, March/April 1974. (Henceforth known as
Schlesinger 's News Conference.)
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with the Soviet Union, including the ability to destroy
"hard" targets like ICBM silos. Secretary Schlesinger
emphasized that the U.S. target plans under the MAD
strategy had included only a few options, all of which
involved a large number of weapons and targets. The new
targeting plans would provide the President with different
options and flexibility to strike fewer targets if circum-
stances dictated. These announcements have sharply in-
creased the debate of strategic counterforce doctrine and
its implications.
Counterforce is the strategy of attacking the ad-
versary's military forces as contrasted with countervalue
,
which is the strategy of attacking the adversary's targets
of high economic or human value including: cities, fac-
tories, energy sources, transportation choke points, etc.
Three levels of counterforce strategy have been debated:
disarming first-strike, damage-limiting counterforce, and
restrained counterforce. 83
Disarming first strike consists of a counterforce
attack sufficient to reduce the adversary's total retalia-
tory capability to a level one considers tolerable. 81*
83 Sherman, R. , "The Fallacies of Counterforce,"
Strategic Review
,




A tolerable level was documented earlier in this study. 85
A disarming first strike against an adversary's ICBM's, for
example, may not be a rational option because of the
victim's capability to retaliate and destroy the aggressor's
society by means of SLBMs and manned bombers. This strategy
assumes that sea- launched nuclear weapons are now, and will
be for the foreseeable future, essentially invulnerable
at sea, and that these forces will comprise a large portion
of each side's nuclear weapons. Damage-limiting counter-
force consists of a strategy whereby, once the U.S. was
attacked by a Soviet first strike, the U.S. would use its
counterforce capability against Soviet reserve nuclear
forces in an attempt to reduce our total damage to a point
which, even though above the "acceptable" level, would be
lower than that we would otherwise sustain. Effective
damage- limiting through counterforce strategy is probably
difficult due to the technologies involved. Restrained
counterforce does not involve a heavy strike for the
purpose of reducing significantly the adversary's capability;
rather it involves employing nuclear devices to "send them





3. Implementation of Counterforce
Restrained Counterforce is Secretary Schlesinger *s
changed strategy to provide additional options to the
President of the United States in the event of a possible
recourse to the use of strategic weapons. Effective
deterrence strategy lies in being able to match the
opponent at different thresholds of violence and make each
escalation more costly for him. The ultimate sanction,
that of full-scale nuclear attack on cities, obviously
would be considered only in the last resort. However,
the United States needs the capability to engage in very
small, as well as very large, nuclear exchanges should the
situation arise. In addition to such "countervalue"
targets as cities, and counterforce targets like missile
forces, the restrained counterforce strategy would include
targets like military staging areas, hydro-electric and
petroleum facilities, dams and bridges. The United States,
Secretary Schlesinger believes, requires the ability to
destroy these targets with a minimum of collateral damage.
Secretary Schlesinger also believes that the United
States needs to maintain a rough symmetry in counterforce
capabilities with the Soviet Union. A situation in which,
for instance, the Soviet Union had the capability to destroy
80 per cent of the American ICBM force with only 20 per
cent of her own force and without the United States
possessing a similar capability is believed unacceptable.
80

This objective, known as "counterforce matching," was
based on the assumption that the United States should seek
to sustain an "essential equivalence" with the Soviet
Union in the overall size and capability of strategic
forces. Secretary Schlesinger believes that strategic
parity must be apparent; it must be seen to exist by
American and Soviet leaders, as well as by third parties.
The principal features of the essential equivalence
posture are listed: 86
1. A capability sufficiently large, diversified,
and survivable so that it will provide us at
all times with high confidence of riding out
even a massive surprise attack and of pene-
trating enemy defenses, and with the ability
to withhold an assured destruction reserve
for an extended period of time.
2. Sufficient warning to ensure the survival
of our heavy bombers together with the bomb
alarm systems and command-control capabili-
ties required by our National Command
Authorities to direct the employment of the
strategic forces in a controlled, selective
and restrained fashion.
3. The forces to execute a wide range of
options in response to potential actions
86 Schlesinger 's News Conference, op. cit
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by an enemy, including a capability for
precise attacks on both soft and hard
targets, while at the same time main-
taining unintended collateral damage.
4. The avoidance of any combination of forces
that could be taken as an effort to acquire
the ability to execute a first-strike dis-
arming attack against the Soviet Union.
5. An offensive capability of such size and
composition that all will perceive it as
in overall balance with the strategic forces
of any potential opponent.
6. Offensive and defensive capabilities and
programs that conform with the provisions
of current arms control agreements and at
the same time facilitate the conclusion
of more permanent treaties to control and,
if possible, reduce the main nuclear
arsenals.
These factors provide a basic insight into the essential
equivalence posture Secretary Schlesinger proposed.
Several programs have been recommended to implement this
new posture including: improved command and control and
rapid retargeting ability; improved inertial guidance for
Minuteman; higher yield for MINUTEMAN; increased MIRV
multiplicity for MINUTEMAN; increasing the payload on
82

TRIDENT II SLBMs ; and conducting long-term research on
terminal maneuvering warhead (MaRV) guidance, which could
eventually provide ICBM and SLBM warhead accuracies not
significantly different from zero CEP, and on increased
MIRV multiplicity.
4. Role of the LRCM in Counterforce
The recommendations do not consider the long-range
cruise missile as a potential weapon system that could con-
tributed to deterrence posture. The LRCM is capable of
performing many of the functions outlined as principal
features of the new program and should be considered in
the list of recommended weapon system changes to implement
that posture. The sea-launched cruise missile has a high
degree of survivability, if the U.S. is attacked by a
massive surprise attack, and has a high probability of
penetrating enemy defenses and inflicting unacceptable
damage on the Soviet Union. Cruise missiles are not
detectable by the ABM system and are marginally detectable
by coastal defense early warning radars. This makes the
LRCM a unique weapon system because the bomber, ICBMs and
SLBMs are all susceptible to penetration defenses. The
submarine is basically invulnerable from attack, assuming
no major improvements in Soviet ASW capability, enabling
the weapons platform to withhold an assured destruction
reserve for an extended period of time and allowing the
negotiation process to function. A LRCM force would enable
83

the President of the United States to execute a wide range
of options in response to potential actions by an enemy,
including a capability for precise attacks on both soft and
hard targets and at the same time minimizing unintended
collateral damage. The LRCM could not be perceived as an
effort to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike
disarming capability against the Soviet Union, because the
warhead yield is small and the flight time to target is
long as compared to the ICBM and SLBM throw weights and
flight times and would probably not be targeted against
ICBM silos. Instead, it would probably be targeted against
other counterforce and countervalue targets. The LRCM
would be perceived as an effort to gain an overall balance
with Soviet offensive strategic forces. The Soviets have
approximately 583 LRCM submarine and airborne launch plat-
forms deployed, capable of carrying about 1270 missiles.
Deploying the LRCM would enable the United States to attain
approximate counterforce matching.
B. DETERRENCE MODEL
Advances in weapons technology have increased the
capabilities of strategic offensive and strategic defensive
systems and threatened the stability of the present triad
as a deterrent system. The criteria for evaluating the
impact of advanced technology or deterrence are highly
complex, requiring sophisticated mathematical calculations
and the construction of complicated models. To facilitate
84

analyzing and understanding the impact of this technology
on stability, an over-simplified deterrent model will be
developed to project the amount of stability ICBMs, SLBMs
,
bombers, MIRVs, ABMs and the LRCM contribute to the deter-
rence system. In developing this model it is assumed that
national governments act in a rational manner to achieve
national goals and strategic objectives. It is also
assumed that each nation's primary strategy is to maintain
retaliatory forces sufficient to deter attack by other
nations
.
The policy of maintaining such retaliatory forces has
been called an "assured destruction" policy. The retalia-
tory capability after attack should be sufficient to assure
the destruction of the aggressor's nation as a viable
society. The ability to absorb an all-out attack and still
maintain sufficient retaliatory forces is the principal
means of deterrence. Hypothetical situations have been
studied in which opposing nations feel secure from attack
because each believes that no feasible attack would reduce
its retaliatory capability to a level potential attackers
could accept. This simplified model will be used to analyze
such mutual deterrence relationships. First the force
required to assure a retaliatory capability must be deter-
mined. Next an examination will be made of the effects of
introducing the dynamics of force growth for two nations,
each attempting to achieve a deterring posture. A comparison
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will then be made of the contributing value of land-based
missile forces, airborne missile forces and submarine
forces to the stability of the deterrence model.
It is assumed that each nation attempts to maintain
retaliatory forces it believes sufficient to deter attack
by any or all other nations. Since its force could be
reduced by an attack, each party must acquire more weapons
that it would otherwise deem necessary to deter attack.
This attempt to achieve mutual deterrence could result in
each party being able to destroy the other by a strike
against urban centers but none being confident that he can
deter the others from a strike directed against his
retaliatory forces. It is easy to imagine this situation
could lead to an "arms race." Even if stability of armaments
is held to be achieveable, it could be viewed as a fragile
situation dependent on some sort of parity being maintained
between the parties involved and the avoidance of a "missile
gap" or a "throw weight gap." As a simple instance, con-
sider a nation fearing an attack by another. Suppose each
believes that two surviving weapons are sufficient to deter
attack. If, on the average, it takes two weapons to
neutralize one, it is easy to see where this theory could
end up in an arms race. If each nation buys two weapons,
each is faced with the possibility of attack by four, which
could eliminate its force. It must then buy two more and
so on. This intuitive description of an arms race can be
86

quite misleading. The fallacy lies in the phrase "on the
average" it takes two weapons to neutralize one, which
does not account for the diminishing threat posed by
additional weaponry.
A simplified deterrence model will be developed that
illustrates the "diminishing returns" phenomenon. It is
an idealization of the situation presented by single and
multiple warhead missiles located in sites dispersed and
hardened against nuclear attack and on airborne and sea-
based platforms. Using this model it can be illustrated
that unlimited arms races need not necessarily occur in
the mutual attempt to achieve deterrent forces providing
both sides have similar numbers of warheads, delivery
systems and throw weight or "essential equivalents."
In developing this idealized model, the number of
missiles the United States and the Soviet Union had deployed
at the time of the Interim Agreement of May 27, 1972, will
be utilized. It is believed the Soviets had about 1618
missiles and the U.S. 1054 missiles. As previously dis-
cussed, deterrence depends on a nation's ability to
deliver unbearable or unacceptable damage to another.
Secretary McNamara indicated that in the case of the
Soviet Union, destruction of one-fourth to one-third of
her population and one-half of her industrial capacity
would serve as an effective deterrent. Such a level of
destruction would probably represent adequate punishment
87

to any twentieth century industrial nation. Legault and
Lindsey 87 have developed an algebraic expression for a
deterrence model which will be utilized to develop this
model and analyze the impact of different weapon systems
on this model.
Our mutual assured destruction framework has led us to
the position where our strategic weapons policy is the
result of a mathematical model of force design. Within this
model a series of points or areas exist which yield the
numbers and types of missiles the United States and the
Soviet Union should maintain for stable deterrence. A
deterrence model can be graphically represented (see
Figure 1). The United States and the Soviet Union repre-
sent opponents in a two-party duel which will be represented
by X and Y, respectively. N is the number of missiles X
possesses and N is the number of missiles Y possesses.
U is expressed as a threshold, representing the damage Y's
missiles could inflict on X's cities, which is considered
intolerable for X, and beyond which X would be deterred
from any further offensive action for fear of provoking
such injury. Similarly, U is a threshold representing the
damage X's missiles could inflict on Y's cities, which is
considered intolerable for Y.
The deterrence model proposes that the two thresholds
U and U need not necessarily be the same number of
























Number of missiles possessed by X
Figure 1. Threshold of deterrence
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missiles. Typical population densities for some U.S.
major cities on a 40-square-mile basis approach 15,000
people per square mile as compared to major Soviet cities
which are smaller and have population densities approaching
20,000 persons per square mile. On balance though, the
Soviet population is more rural than the U.S. population.
Two hundred and one Soviet cities have populations of more
than 100,000 inhabitants, accounting for approximately
30% of the total population, whereas 65% of the total U.S.
population is located in 216 cities having more than 100,000
inhabitants. Only 10 major Soviet cities have populations
greater than one million. 88 Forty-three per cent of the
U.S. population is targetable by the SS-N-3 cruise missile
(assuming a 550 NM missile range launched 200 NM from the
coast). This percentage includes 138 major U.S. cities
having populations greater than 100,000 inhabitants. 89
Generally for a given weapon yield, greater density cities
will result in higher casualties than lower density cities.
However, since the Soviet population is more rural and the
cities are smaller, larger numbers of weapons are needed
to inflict equal levels of damage. Tables 12 and 13,
Appendix A, list the approximate number of one MT weapons




needed to inflict a 25% casualty rate on the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. as 250 and 200, respectively. Potential targeting
for casualties greater than 251 would require increasingly
larger numbers of weapons eventually approaching an
exponential growth rate. Appendix B lists the major cities
and Table XIII displays the number of cities targeted to
efficiently attain a potential 25% casualty rate. As
evidenced by Table XIII all major cities were potentially
targeted to attain a minimum unacceptable damage level.
One nation may be prepared to face greater sacrifices
than the other, influencing the "unacceptable damage"
threshold the other may perceive as unbearable. Hence X
and Y may not make the same estimates of U and U . AJ x y
key point which must be emphasized in building this model
is that the number of missiles needed is X's estimate of
what Y perceives is unacceptable damage to X and U is the
number of missiles required to inflict that perceived
unbearable damage. Similarly, U is the number of missiles
required to inflict what X perceives as unacceptable damage
to Y and U is the number of missiles required to inflict
.A.
that damage. U and U ' s thresholds may be interpreted
x y
differently by different officials in both the U.S.S.R.
and U.S.; however, in constructing this model, a 25%
casualty rate will be considered as acceptable damage
for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The number of weapons
required to inflict 60 million casualties can be determined
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utilizing scaling techniques on empirical data collected
from the Japan incident. Appendix E contains a comprehen-
sive analysis of how casualties are translated into numbers
and yields of warheads. From this analysis it was deter-
mined that to inflict unacceptable damage (60 million
casualties) on the Soviet Union, the U.S. needs approxi-
mately 250 one-MT warheads and the U.S.S.R. needs approxi-
mately 200 one-MT warheads to inflict similar damage on
the U.S. (50 million casualties).
Figure 1 shows a rectangle OU AU . Any point such as
x y
Po which is inside this rectangle represents a situation
in which there is no deterrence in either direction. In
constructing this model, partial deterrence is neglected
and the assumption is made that U and U represent deter-
rence for X and Y. Hence U and U actually represent the
x y
number of missiles (warheads) that must survive a first
strike (commonly known as the second-strike force) which
are then launched by the attacked country against the
attacker's cities (countervalue) and are capable of inflict
ing unacceptable damage to her population and industrial
capacity; hence, the theory of mutual assured destruction.
A more detailed development of this model is contained
in Appendix F.
When the point P(N
,
N ) in Figure 1 is outside the
x y
box marked "no deterrence," the situation becomes more




X can keep U of his missiles in reserve, to threaten Y's
cities, and use the remaining missiles to launch a counter-
force strike against Y's missiles. This model assumes
all missiles are ICBMs installed in hardened silos. If
the attack is initiated, a certain number of Y's missiles
would be destroyed. The key factor which must be considered
by X is how many of Y's missile silos can be destroyed in
the attack. Considering only the ICBM portion of the Triad,
if Y is left with at least U missiles, Y can retaliate
against X's cities and inflict unacceptable damage. Hence,
the deterrence model functions on the principle that
unless the potential attacker can destroy enough missiles in
a counterforce strike to reduce the number of missiles
below the U or U level, the attacker is deterred. The
x y
attacker would not have a first-strike capability and the
attacked country would have a second-strike capability.
The number of missiles that could be destroyed in a counter-
force strike depends on a number of factors discussed in
Appendix E.
Suppose that C designates the probability that, if one
of X's missiles is fired at one of Y's missile silos, the
target will be destroyed. Similarly C would designate
the probability of destroying one of X's missile silos.
The next model (see Figure 2) considers the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. strategic missile forces deployed on submarines.







































(N < U so X is not deterred by Y)
(N > U so Y is deterred by X)
x x
U. N
Figure 2. Possible deterrent situation
for SLBM's and SLCM's.
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coefficients of counterforce effectiveness, C and C
,x y
would be equal to zero. In this model there is no counter-
force capability and it approaches an ideal stable deter-
rent posture. More than half the U.S. strategic missile
force and approximately one-third the Soviet strategic
missile force is maintained in submarines which greatly
increases the stability of the total strategic model. If
there is no effective ABM defense for the cities, then all
area to the right of point A represents a state of mutual
deterrence. Should all strategic weapons be deployed on
submarine platforms, there would be no potential for a
first-strike capability, thus maximizing the stability of
the model. The two zones labeled unilateral deterrence
are self-explanatory and are discussed in detail in
Appendix F.
The next model (see Figure 3) considers the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. strategic missile forces deployed in hardened
ICBM silos. The coefficients of counterforce effective-
ness, C and C , are greater than zero but less than one.
x y
Assume that the thresholds of deterrence are U = 250 and
U = 200 as discussed in Appendix E. Suppose X is con-
templating a counterforce strike against Y's silos. If X
is not capable of destroying enough of Y's missile silos
to reduce her force to less than U , X will not be able to
strike. Missiles are not one-hundred per cent reliable













i+0 600 800 1000 1200
Number of missiles possessed by X
li+OO
Figure 3. Deterrence of X by Y.
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determine the number of missiles required to destroy a
target. U = 250 and U = 200 thresholds would be the
x y
number of missiles which reach their targets and not the
number available for potential launch. Assume that the
counterforce effectiveness coefficient C is 0.5, so that
a missile belonging to X and aimed at Y's missile silos
has a fifty per cent probability of destroying it.
Consider the case where C is 0.5 and X has 1054 missiles
and Y has 532 missiles P(N = 1054 and N = 532); see Figure 3
x y
X can afford to aim two of his missiles at each of 268
silos, and one each at the remaining 264 silos. Employing
probability laws, the number of silos expected to survive
the attack would be 200, which is the number required to
inflict unacceptable damage on X, assuming no losses due to
malfunctions from launch to impact. Hence, when N >_ 53 2,
X is deterred from attacking Y, but when N < 532, X is not
deterred. P marks the point between a state of mutual
deterrence and a state of unilateral deterrence. Similar
calculations can be made varying the numbers of X and Y's
missiles obtaining the geometric locus obtained in Figure 3.
In constructing the models three states of deterrence
were identified: mutual deterrence, unilateral deterrence
or no deterrence. Stability could be defined as the absence
of a rational motive to launch an attack. When a rational
motive exists on either side to launch a first strike, there
is instability. It is possible to have a state of stable
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deterrence or of unstable deterrence. See Figure 4.
Stability is not necessarily associated with near
equality of forces on both sides either. Assume X possesses
a very large force but Y does not have enough missiles to
inflict punishment on X by an unopposed countervalue first
strike; a stable unilateral deterrence state would exist.
Should Y begin accumulating missiles, alarming X over the
intended use of the missiles, X could disarm Y before
reaching the threshold of deterrence U , and the state of
unilateral deterrence would have become unstable. The
zone labeled AQ and AP is an area of stable mutual deter-
rence. All points falling in this zone will result in
stable mutual deterrence, since neither side has the
ability to launch a counterforce first-strike and destroy
enough missiles to keep the other side from retaliating.
The ALCM was not considered in the deterrent model.
C. STRATEGIC FACTORS
Some general conclusions can be drawn when considering
the various combinations of strategic forces and their
impact on the deterrence model. Increasing accuracies of
land-based ICBMs decrease the stable mutual deterrence
zone and decrease the overall stability of the model.
MIRVing ICBMs produces a double unstable zone and reduces
the stable mutual deterrence zone, further decreasing the
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u
Figure 4. Stable and unstable deterrence
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to a pre-emptive first-strike attack, making the submarine
launched missile platform the stabilizing factor in the
deterrence model. If all strategic missiles were deployed
on submarines, the unstable unilateral deterrence zone
would be replaced by stable mutual deterrence resulting
in a very stable model.
Bombers have not been addressed in this model. They
are vulnerable to pre-emptive first strike, but with
adequate threat warning their bomber base survivability
would probably be fairly good. Bombers are probably
primarily considered a non-ICBM silo counterforce and
countervalue weapon, and may not factor into the first-
strike counterforce model to the extent that ICBMs and
SLBMs do. Admittedly, bombers could be targeted against
hardened ICBM silos, but the bomber's force was initially
built to support the massive retaliation doctrine and that
mission was not designed to strike hardened silos.
EMP phenomenon and fratricide effects could very well
increase the importance of the bomber and the LRCM in a
nuclear exchange. Radiation effects on the complex and
delicate electronic equipment of a missile and its launch-
ing facilities, even in a reinforced and shilded silo,
are not completely understood by the scientific community.
Real-world nuclear radiation effects may prove the bomber
to be the most reliable and potent force of the land-based
Triad systems. Bombers carry the bulk of the U.S.
100

megatonnage making them a very important contributing
force to deterrence. The force can be effectively employed
in foreign policy efforts to demonstrate resolve because
it still maintains the man-machine interface and can be
called back once launched. Inflight retargeting is another
important function the bomber can accomplish by maintaining
a "man in the loop" policy. This might also apply to the
air-launched cruise missile.
The bomber force carries four and one-half times the
megatonnage the Soviet bomber force carries, making the
U.S. "total" potential timely deliverable weapons yield
less efficient than the Soviets, who have the majority
of their potential throw weight on ballistic missiles.
Soviet ballistic missile CEP improvements could gain them
a significant hard target kill potential, resulting in an
unstable counterforce asymmetry. The Soviets would then
acquire a strategic coercive capability enabling them to
greatly influence foreign policy objectives. Secretary
Schlesinger 's projected Soviet CEP estimate of 500 to 700
meters by the mid-1980' s suggests that such a strategic
imbalance will exist in the near future.
Assessing the bomber and missile forces' contribution
to the future deterrence model is difficult to analyze
without considering the type of war which will be fought.
A massive pre-emptive first strike followed by an aggressive
second strike, instead of attempting to resolve the conflict
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through negotiations, combined with accelerated nuclear
war fighting doctrine, would favor the missile as a
delivery vehicle. Scenarios emphasizing the negotiation
process, but stopping short of nuclear war, may favor the
bomber because of its ability to be called back.
The area between massive pre-emptive strike and success-
ful negotiations is a very gray area which could be viewed
from a potential nuclear war fighting point of view as
being in the Soviets' favor because their potential throw
weight advantage could be translated into perceived strategic
superiority and be used in negotiations as a coercive means
of gaining their objectives.
Restrained counterforce strategy probably best describes
the gray area discussed. Restrained counterforce does not
involve a heavy strike for the purpose of reducing signifi-
cantly the adversary's capability; rather it involves
employing nuclear devices to demonstrate resolve or "send
them a message" and thereby discourage further escalation.
Restrained counterforce is Secretary Schlesinger ' s strategy
to provide additional options to the President of the
United States in the event of a possible recourse to the
use of strategic weapons. Effective deterrence strategy
requires matching the opponent at different thresholds
of violence and making each escalation more costly for him.
The ultimate sanction, that of full-scale nuclear attack
on cities, obviously would be considered only in the last
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resort. The bomber force may not be as efficient in some
cases, in executing a restrained counterforce scenario as
a highly accurate LRCM surgical strike, but it does have
some advantages. A general assessment of the bomber and
its impact on the deterrence model must include its inherent
flexibility as a launch platform which contributes to
stability. The amount of stability it contributes is a
function of the type of war being fought and the targeting
philosophy of a country. The model was constructed using
the ballistic missile as the counterforce target to aid in
understanding deterrence stability. Although bombers could
be factored into the model, such effort was not deemed
worthwhile for this study. Without modeling, it could be
assessed that the bombers contribute to the stability of
the deterrence model and the degree they contribute is a
function of the war fighting scenario being considered.
Focusing now on the long-range cruise missile and its
potential contribution to the deterrence model discussed,
some general observations can be made concerning its contri-
bution to deterrence. The sea-launch cruise missile would
be invulnerable to attack contributing stability to the
deterrence model. Like the SLBM, the coefficient of counter
force for the SLCM would be zero. As a result, the stable
unilateral deterrence zone would be increased, discouraging
the Soviet Union from launching a pre-emptive first strike.
The LRCM would contribute to the restrained counterforce
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strategy because of its surgical strike capability, providing
the President additional strategic options in the event
of a possible recourse to the use of strategic nuclear
weapons. Delivering weapons with precision, even at very
long ranges, would make it possible to substitute small
weapons for large ones and reduce potential casualties.
This capability would greatly increase the effectiveness
and discrimination with which force can be applied in
demonstrating resolve. These developments would contribute
to the goal of being able to respond to different functional
levels of conflict managed in scope according to the
goals of the foreign policy objectives involved. The
prospect of being able to implement more effective action,
with less collateral damage, would enhance our deterrence
posture and greatly increase the stability of the model
when engaged in different levels of war fighting strategy.
High probabilities of penetrating enemy defenses and
striking targets with surgical accuracy contribute to
deterrence stability because the adversary would not be
allowed prior warning of a launch until the specifically
identified target was destroyed. Having the capability
to engage in conflict with this degree of control would
greatly decrease the probability of conflicts escalating
to total nuclear exchange. The adversary's knowledge of
a reserve force having a high degree of survivability
which was capable of inflicting unacceptable damage would
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persuade that actor to consider negotiations instead of
further confrontation. Threatening to destroy a specific
target and then surgically removing it would gain a great
psychological advantage and bring stability to a potential
unstable situation.
Sea-launched cruise missiles could contribute stability
to the potential ICBM counterforce asymmetry. The LRCM has
reached an advanced development stage enabling rapid deploy-
ment to counter that threat, as compared to other weapons
system modifications which are not scheduled to become
operational until the mid-1980' s. The LRCM could be opera-
tional by the early 1980' s 90 and provide the U.S. a margin
of deterrence stability, should the Soviets' new family
of ICBMs become operational before the planned weapons
modifications are deployed. The Soviets could use their
throw weight advantage as a coercive attempt to influence
foreign policy, but perceiving the surgical strike capabil-
ity of the LRCM, they would be dissuaded from emphasizing
that advantage and deterrence stability would be maintained.
Reprogramming LRCMs to targets which were assigned to
ballistic missiles, but never destroyed due to malfunctions
in the various flight stages, ABM interceptions, fratricide-
induced inaccuracies or other problems, could be an important
role for the missile. The platform would be positioned in





the forward area near the action zone enabling near real-
time reprogramming and employing the shoot-look-shoot
technique
.
The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) has similar
targeting capabilities. The survivability of the platform
is probably not as invulnerable as the submarine at present,
but randomly based and forward deployed aircraft could
provide an adequate degree of survival, contributing to
deterrence stability. Air-launched cruise missiles deployed
on bombers and launched in conjunction with bomber defense
penetration would probably provide a higher probability of
bomber survival due to defense saturation. ALCM flight
altitudes would probably decrease rapidly after aircraft
separation confusing the air defense system. Once launched,
the ALCM would function in the same manner as the sea-
launched cruise missile.
The Soviet Union has approximately 113 submarine and
aircraft strategic cruise missile launch platforms deployed
capable of carrying about 420 missiles. These platforms
increase the Soviets' deterrence stability because they are
not as vulnerable to attack as silos. Recent open-source
literature indicating the Soviets' development of the
SS-NX-12 as a possible replacement for the SS-N-3 and
modification of the AS-4 for installation on the BACKFIRE
indicates the Soviets' demonstrated satisfaction with the
cruise missile as a possible strategic or tactical weapons
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system. Deployment of the U.S. LRCM in at least the same






The Vladivostok agreement signed on November 24, 1974,
is a relatively straightforward document which provides an
overall ceiling of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles for
each party with a sub-limitation of 1,320 missiles which
may be equipped with MIRVs.
The Vladivostok aide memoire was intended to set the
framework for a new interim agreement between the two powers
on the limitation of strategic weapons. The aide memoire
was intended as a simple document which would serve as an
interim agreement while the arms control delegations of the
two countries drafted an agreed text for a second
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), which President
Ford and Secretary Brezhnev were to sign at a Washington,
D.C., summit meeting in June, 1975.
The aide memoire has remained a classified document
available to a limited number of people, but published open-
source literature indicates that knowledgeable U.S. Govern-
ment officials and Soviet officials interpret the document
with different understandings.
The two delegations commenced their formal meetings in
Geneva on January 30, 1975, and after three unproductive
months they recessed the talks in early May when it became
clear that the middle-echelon arms control officials could
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not come to an agreement on critically important differences
and that a top-level negotiating effort would be necessary
to resolve the differences . An official announcement was
then made that the summit meeting in Washington would have
to be delayed until the fall at the earliest.
What became clear in the three months of discussions
between U.S. and Soviet arms control delegations in Geneva
is that the aide memoire raised as many unexpected new
questions as it attempted to answer. MIRV verification and
counting the BACKFIRE bomber as a strategic launcher are
two problems. The third problem which developed is the
status of the cruise missile. The Vladivostok understand-
ing provides that air-launched missiles with a range in
excess of 600 km will be counted against the overall ceiling
of 2,400 delivery vehicles. The air-launched cruise missile
(ALCM) now in advanced development by the Air Force would
have a range capability in excess of 600 km (372 miles).
A single B-l bomber will be able to carry 24 of these weapons
Under a literal interpretation of the aide memoire, a single
B-l with this force loading would count as one per cent of
the overall allowance of 2,400 delivery vehicles. This
limitation is obviously unacceptable to the U.S. Government.
The U.S. and Soviet Union have maintained operational bomber-
launched cruise missiles, the Soviet KANGAROO and the U.S.
HOUND DOG, having ranges in excess of 600 km for years which




The status of the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) was
evidently not considered in any way by the Vladivostok
accord, and available literature indicates there was little
discussion of the SLCM in the Geneva negotiating sessions.
The Soviet Union's proposals in the January, 1976,
round of SALT talks in Moscow tie reductions of strategic
delivery vehicle limits below the 2,400 set in Vladivostok
to restrictions for the U.S. sea-launched cruise missile.
The U.S. expects to resume negotiations in the spring of
1976 with counter-proposals modifying the Soviet offer.
Details of the Soviet proposal include: (1) A reduction
of total strategic delivery vehicles to a level of about
2,200. This would require the Soviets to phase out some
systems now operational, while the U.S. is currently below
the level proposed. Both sides, however, would be limited
to deployment of new strategic systems without reductions
in other areas. This new limit is linked to the BACKFIRE
and cruise missile deployment issues. (2) Permitting deploy-
ment of the ALCM without limiting the range to 600 Km. Air-
launched weapons would not count within the 2,400 limit
for strategic delivery vehicles or the reduced ceiling
proposed by the Soviets, but bombers or tanker aircraft
armed with ALCMs would count within the 1,320 MIRV ceiling
which would remain unchanged from Vladivostok. (3) Limita-
tions on the SLCM to the 600 Km the USSR has already
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proposed. The Soviet position is that SLCMs with a range
in excess of 600 km would be counted in the strategic
delivery ceiling. 91
The SLCM proposal is not a realistic proposal because
"the Soviets already have operational more than 2000 SS-N-3
cruise missiles ... in all types of platforms ... and the weapon
is considered to have a nuclear warhead, ... the U.S.S.R.
can cover half the U.S. from the 100-fathom line of the
coast with the SHADDOCK cruise missile's range and warhead." 92
C. VERIFICATION
The greatest disadvantage of the long-range cruise
missile, and especially the submarine-launched version, is
its impact on arms limitation efforts. The obvious pre-
requisite for any international agreement limiting one
or more weapon system is that the agreement can be verified.
It has become customary practice to require that the verifi-
cation can be carried out without on-site inspection. The
theorem then that governs arms limitation is that an agree-
ment on limiting a weapon is possible only if compliance
to it can be verified by non-intrusive means, that is, by
national technical means.
9 Robinson, C. A., "Soviets Make New SALT Bid,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology
,







The SLCM now being developed includes two versions, one
strategic and one tactical, which are externally identical.
In addition, since both weapons will be encapsulated in a
canister for firing from a torpedo tube, it will be physi-
cally impossible to distinguish between the two versions
without literally dismantling the weapon. Since this
constitutes highly intrusive inspection, it will be unaccept-
able to both the U.S. and Soviet Union.
The desirable method for controlling the proliferation
of strategic cruise missiles would probably be placing a
limit on the number of platforms that carry the missile.
The Soviet Union presently has 67 submarines deployed with
cruise missiles. Not all platforms are modern nuclear
submarines so possibly allowing each country 40 launch
platforms may be a reasonable solution to the missile





The long-range cruise missile will add a measure of
stability to the strategic deterrent balance and contribute
to the restrained counterforce doctrine. The sea-launch
cruise missile platform would be invulnerable to a counter-
force first-strike attack providing the United States with
a non-time sensitive reserve weapon capable of inflicting
unacceptable damage on the adversary, hence increasing the
stability of deterrence. The long-range cruise missile
would contribute to the restrained counterforce strategy
objective because its low probability of intercept and
surgical strike capability would provide the President of
the United States additional strategic options in the
conduct of foreign policy. This capability would greatly
increase the effectiveness and discrimination with which
force can be brought to bear in demonstrating resolve.
Geographic asymmetries between the United States and
Soviet Union influence the sophistication and range a cruise
missile must possess to attain similar targeting results.
The U.S. coasts are readily accessible by medium-range
missiles launched from submarines whereas the Soviet
coasts are inland, for the most part, requiring long-range
missiles having more complex guidance systems.
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Upgrading the SS-N-3 with current state-of-the-art
turbofan technology could enable the Soviets to attain
ranges of approximately 1500 miles and allow them the
potential to strike most of the countervalue targets in
the United States.
SS-N-3 guidance improvements would probably be required
should the Soviets upgrade the power plant with a turbofan
engine. Employing "off the shelf" ICBM inertial guidance
technology could yield accuracies of a few hundred feet at
ranges of 1500 miles.
Employing a Tercom type system in the SS-N-3 missile
would probably not be cost-effective for the Soviets.
Effective countervalue strikes can be obtained without
employing this level of technology.
More than fifty per cent of the total U.S. population
lives within potential targeting range of the Soviets'
SS-N-3. Approximately 50% of the population, targetable by
the SS-N-3, lives in cities having more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants. The Soviets could potentially inflict unacceptable
damage on the United States using their cruise missile
weapons systems in a strategic role. Improving the range
and accuracy of their cruise missiles would allow the
Soviets to potentially strike a great majority of U.S. counter-
value and a significant number of counterforce targets.
The most salient targeting asymmetry is the distance from
reasonable secure weapon launch positions to Soviet
114

counterforce and countervalue targets. The majority of the
U.S. population is concentrated near the coasts whereas
the majority of the Soviet population is located greater
than 1000 NM from various European waters. This factor
makes the U.S. cruise missile potential targeting problem
much more difficult than the Soviets'.
The LRCM poses a challenge to present early warning
systems and air defense forces in both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. Radar cross-section reduction efforts have
decreased the U.S. SLCM radar return to a size where
current air defense radars will probably not be capable
of adequately detecting and tracking. New radars or other
types of sensors capable of operating against a low-
altitude small radar cross-section target will probably
have to be developed.
The major portion of the U.S. strategic megatonnage is
deployed in the strategic bomber, compared to the Soviets
who have their major portion deployed in strategic missiles
This throw weight advantage coupled with an increased
ballistic missile accuracy will pose a substantial first-
strike threat to U.S. land-based ICBM's by the mid-1980's.
Increased re-entry vehicle accuracies will greatly
increase Soviet weapons lethality. A plausible mid-1980 's
ballistic missile deployment could allow the Soviets to
gain a three-to-one advantage in both counterforce and
countervalue potential. Deploying the SLCM would decrease
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the CMP asymmetry "gap" and decrease the potential strategic
instability.
The Soviets could use their potential throw weight and
lethality advantage as a coercive attempt to influence
foreign policy decisions. However, their knowledge of the
U.S. LRCM surgical strike capability would dissuade them
from exploiting that political and military advantage.
The Soviets' proposal to limit the SLCM range to 600 Km
would allow the Soviets to maintain a weapon system capable
of potentially inflicting unacceptable damage on the United
States. Denying the U.S. the opportunity to deploy a
similar system would greatly decrease deterrence stability
and create an equivalence "gap."
New technologies would not be employed allowing the
adversary an opportunity to further expand his missile
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The purpose of this appendix is to analyze the various
factors contributing to effective employment of nuclear
weapons capable of counterforce and countervalue roles and
examine how these capabilities may be interpreted to derive
realistic and credible numbers of warheads needed to develop
a deterrence model. Some equations used in developing the
deterrence model in this appendix were derived by Dr. William
Reese, Department of Physics and Chemistry, for a Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy course taught at the Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, California. Equations are derived
using "ball-park" inputs with the intent of keeping the
calculations simple to understand and yet to present data
which are close to real-world results. Open-source
literature data have been utilized for the calculations
and, where no data were available, realistic estimates
were made. This study will not address the detailed
phenomenology involved in nuclear fission or fusion. A
detailed explanation is presented in a publication entitled
"The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" published by the Atomic
Energy Commission. 102
1 ° 2 Glasstone, S. , The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
,
United States Atomic Energy Commission, April 1962.
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B. NUCLEAR BLAST EFFECTS
The amount of energy released by a one-kiloton (KT)
nuclear explosion is equivalent to a conventional unit of
energy release equal to one thousand short tons of TNT, or
about 10 calories, 1.15 x 10 kilowatt hours or 1.8 x 10
BTU's. This energy release is about the maximum energy
generated in the largest nuclear power plants in a couple of
hours, but in a nuclear explosion all energy is released
in a few millionths of a second.
Once a nuclear chain reaction starts in a weapon, it
goes to completion very rapidly as the dynamics of exponen-
tial growth take place. The released energy emerges in the
form of blast and shock, thermal radiation and radiological
effects. The exact partition of energy gained from a nuclear
explosion depends on the weapon type (fission or fusion) and
the surroundings at detonation, e.g., atmosphere, high alti-
tude, underwater, etc. Fission-fusion weapons have a slightly
higher fraction of energy associated with neutrons (which do
not travel as far as gamma rays) than do fission weapons.
At low altitude, the resulting energy released in a nuclear
explosion is partitioned as 501 blast and shock, 35% thermal
radiation and 15% radiological effects (51 initial and 10%
delayed). Thus, for a 200KT weapon, the energy released
will be in the form of 100KT blast and shock, 70KT thermal
radiation and 30KT radialogical effects.
The major material damage caused by an air burst
nuclear weapon is due to blast and shock which accompanies
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the explosion. The majority of structures will suffer
some damage from air blast when the overpressure in the
blast wave is about one-half pound per square inch or more.
The distance to which this overpressure level will extend
depends on the yield or size of the explosion and the height
of the burst. In considering the destructive effect of a
blast wave, one of the important characteristics is the
overpressure. The maximum overpressure value, i.e., at
the blast wave (or shock) front, is called the "peak over-
pressure." As the blast wave travels in the air away from
its source, the overpressure at the front steadily decreases,
and the pressure behind the front falls off in a regular
manner. After a short time, when the shock front has
traveled a certain distance from the fireball, the pressure
behind the front drops below that of the surrounding
atmosphere and a so-called "negative phase" of the blast
wave forms. During the negative (rarefraction or suction)
phase, a partial vacuum is produced and air is sucked in,
instead of being pushed away, as it is when the overpressure
is positive. Forces accompanying the peak overpressure and
negative phase cause most of the physical damage to struc-
tures. Blast and shock producing 60 pounds per square inch
overpressure are fatal to 90% of the people exposed.
One of the important differences between a nuclear and
a conventional high-explosive weapon is the large proportion
of the energy of a nuclear explosion which is released in
the form of thermal (or heat) radiation. Because of the
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enormous amount of energy liberated per unit mass in a
nuclear weapon, very high temperatures are attained.
These are estimated to be several tens of million degrees,
compared with a few thousand degrees in the case of a con-
ventional explosion. As a consequence of these high tempera-
tures, a considerable amount of energy is released in the
form of electromagnetic radiation of short wave length.
Initially, this is mainly in the soft X-ray region of the
spectrum. However, X-rays are absorbed in the air, thereby
heating it to high temperatures. This heated air, which
constitutes the nuclear explosion fireball in turn radiates
in a spectral region roughly similar to that of sunlight
received at the earth's surface. It is the radiation
(ultraviolet, visible and infrared) from the fireball,
traveling at the velocity of light, which is received at
distances from the explosion. The delay, therefore, be-
tween the emission of thermal radiation from the fireball
and its arrival at a target miles away obviously is extremely
short.
Although blast is responsible for most of the destruc-
tion caused by a nuclear air burst, thermal radiation will
contribute to the overall damage by igniting combustible
materials and thus starting fires in buildings or forests.
These fires may spread rapidly among the debris produced
by the blast. In addition, thermal radiation is capable
of causing skin burns and eye injuries in exposed individ-
uals. The extent of injury or damage caused by thermal
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radiation or the chances of igniting combustible material
depend to a large extent upon the amount of thermal radia-
tion energy received by a unit area of skin, fabric, or
other exposed material within a short interval of time.
Thermal energy falling upon a given area from a specific
explosion will decrease as the distance is increased from
the explosion. Thermal energy is attenuated by the
atmosphere due to absorption and scattering. Because of
absorption, the thermal radiation, particularly that in
the ultraviolet region, decreases markedly with increasing
distance from the explosion. Some of the absorbed radiation
is subsequently re-radiated, but the emission occurs with
equal probability in all directions, so that the quantity pro
ceeding in the direction of a given target is substantially
reduced. Attenuation as a result of scattering, i.e., by
the diversion of rays from their original paths, occurs
with radiation of all wave lengths. The diversion of the
radiation path due to scattering interaction leads to a
somewhat diffuse, rather than direct, transmission of the
thermal radiation. Thermal radiation having an intensity
of 12 grams/cm will cause third-degree burns.
Radioactive particles emitted from a nuclear explosion
consist of Alpha, Beta and Gamma particles and neutrons.
An Alpha particle is really a helium nucleus (two neutrons
and two protons) and is the least harmful. A Beta particle
is actually an electron and is the second most harmful to
living tissue. A Gamma particle is a ray similar to a
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light ray but has a shorter wave length (X-rays). Gamma
rays and neutrons are by far the most damaging to living
tissue and the ones usually considered when making radia-
tion calculations.
In order to express the exposure of Gamma radiation (or
X-rays) at any particular point, it is necessary to have a
suitable unit of measurement. The unit which is specifi-
cally used in this connection os called the "Roentgen." By
definition a Roentgen is defined as the quantity of Gamma
q
radiation which will give rise to the formation of 2.08 x 10
ion pairs per cubic centimeter of dry air. 103 More simply
it is a measure of x-ray exposure.
The unit of measurement used to determine the amount
(or dose) of radiation absorbed is called the "Rad." By
definition, the Rad is the absorbed dose of any nuclear
radiation which is accompanied by the liberation of 100 ergs
of energy per gram of absorbing material
.
l ° k
Although all ionizing radiations are capable of pro-
ducing similar biological effects, the absorbed dose
(measured in Rads) , which will produce a certain effect, may
vary appreciably from one type of radiation to another.
This difference in behavior is expressed by means of the
"Relative Biological Effectiveness" (RBE) of the particular
nuclear radiation. The RBE of a given radiation is defined





as the ratio of the absorbed dose in Rads of Gamma radiation
to the absorbed dose in Rads of the given radiation having
the same biological effects. Another unit known as the
"Roentgen Equivalent Man" (REM) is used to express energy
absorption, but it does not take into account the biological
effect of the particular nuclear radiation absorbed. The
REM which is defined by
Dose in REM's = RBE x Dose in rads. (A-l)
provides an indication of the extent of biological injury
that would result from the absorption of nuclear radiation.
Thus, a REM is a dose unit of biological effects. A dose
of 1000 REM's is fatal to 90% of the people exposed. 105
In summary a basic understanding of the difference
between conventional and nuclear weapons is useful in
becoming familiar with how they can be most effectively
employed and the resultant effects. Blast and shock
account for the majority of the damage and overpressures
of 60 pounds per square inch will be fatal to 90% of the
people exposed.
C. SCALING LAWS
In order to be able to calculate the characteristic
properties of the blast wave from an explosion of any
1 5 Glasstone, op. cit., p. 595
156

given energy, if characteristic values for another energy-
are known, appropriate scaling laws can be and are applied.
With the aid of such laws it is possible to express the
data for a large range of energies in a simple form.
Theoretically, a given pressure will occur at a distance
from an explosion that is proportional to the cube root of
the weapon yield. Thus, cube root scaling may be applied
over a wide range of explosion energies. According to this
law, if R, is the range (or slant range) from a reference
explosion of W, kilotons yield at which a certain over-
pressure or dynamic pressure is attained, then for any
explosion of W
?
kilotons yield these same pressures will




It follows therefore that
1/3
'2
Ri\rJR. -h($ CA " 3)
If the reference explosion is conveniently chosen as having
an energy yield of 1 KT so that W = 1 it follows, there-










where R, refers to the distance from a 1-KT yield explosion.
Consequently, if the range R~ is specified, then the value
of the yield explosion, W , required to produce a certain
effect, e.g., a given peak overpressure, can be calculated.
Alternatively, if the yield W is specified, the appropriate
range R
?
can be evaluated from equation (A-4).
Thermal damage is a bit more complicated to scale than
blast and shock. However, if atmospheric attenuation is
neglected (which is approximately valid except for the
highest yields) , thermal damage scales approximately by the




= R x W
2
1/2 (A-5)
assuming that all factors are referenced to 1-KT yield as
in equation (A-4). Utilizing these scaling laws Table XI
was constructed.
Empirical data collected from the Japan incident are
listed in Tables XII and XIII to display real-world damage
capabilities and are utilized to derive a valid methodology
to predict future weapon employment effects.
D. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The two Japan incidents provided useful empirical data
to compute potential qualitative capabilities. These data
can be utilized to develop a simple model to project




SCALED NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATA
Effects
Radiological: 1000 REM's 901 fatalities
Blast and Shock: 60 PSI 901 fatalities
2
Thermal: 12 cal/cm (third-degree burns)
DISTANCE AT WHICH EFFECTS OCCUR
Blast
and
W (KT) Radiological Shock Therm
1 .42 .09 .25
10 .60 .19 .80
20 .76 .25 1.1
50 .85 .34 1.7
100 1.0 .42 2.4
200 1.15 .53 3.4
1000 1.5 .92 7.5
5000 1.8 1.57 15.0
25,000 2.2 2.7 33.5
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densities. In developing this model it is assumed that all
persons inside R,-
n





is the range from ground zero to a
point where 50% casualties occur. It also assumes a
1/2
scaling intermediate between thermal (R - W ) and blast
1/3
and shock (R ~ W ' ) yielding an average scaling law
(R z W ' ) . The range R,-
n
for a 20KT weapon is assumed
to be approximately 4/5 mile (R, * 4/5 mi).






thus producing a lethal area of kill A,
A _ „ v 2 _/W\ 0.8.2 rA _.Ak " ^50 " 2[2<J) mi (A " 7)





= tt(4/5) 2 = 2^°' 8 mi 2 (A-8)
If the population density is N (number of persons per
square mile) the N, (number killed) will be approximately
Nk - 2NP(lo)
0,8
Persons (A - 9 )
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Comparing the empirical density, zone and per cent
casualties data in the two events, it is significant to note
that geography and physical protection rather than weapon
characteristics account for most of the differences in
damage. Different environments provide various degrees of
protection and are listed in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHELTER PROTECTION DATA
Type Structure R^ range (mi)
a. Persons in concrete buildings 0.12
b. Average shelter protection 0.8
c. Unprotected (outdoors) 1.3





5 KT 200 KT 1 MT 5 MT 2 5 MT
R
5Q (mi) 1.15 2.0 3.8 7.3 13.9
Ak (mi
2
) 4.2 12.6 45.7 166 600
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These results indicate that for the typical compact
Soviet city (40-60 mi ) a warhead with a yield between one
and two MT would be an ideal countervalue weapon. Warheads
greater than five MT would be in excess of the yield required
except for sprawling, low-density targets such as the majority
of the cities in the U.S.
E. DETERRENT FORCE MODEL
In developing a deterrence model it is useful to
understand that mutual assured destruction (MAD) , as current-
ly implemented, consists of a triad of sufficient strategic
nuclear delivery forces (land-based ICBM's, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), and long-range heavy
bombers) to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor
even after absorbing a counterforce first strike from the
aggressor. "Unacceptable damage" has been generally defined
for computational and explanatory purposes as substantial
damage to industrial capacity (e.g., 25 per cent destruc-
tion from blast effects alone), and substantial urban
population deaths (e.g., the prompt death of one-fourth to
one-third of all urban population).
Unacceptable damage is a term that requires quantitative
and qualitative translation into numbers and types of war-
heads which will provide a credible deterrent force. This
model assumes that 60 million casualties (approximately
251 of the Soviet population) would be unacceptable damage
and that the number of weapons required to inflict such
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damage would provide such a credible deterrent. Fifty
million casualties is approximately 25% of the U.S. popula-
tion. As a baseline force, warheads of approximately one MT
will be considered which are typical of the POLARIS,
MINUTEMAN I, SS-II and SS-N-6 and possibly the SS-N-3 (if
the Soviets upgrade the engine and warhead to state-of-the-
art technology and install it in the same sized airframe).
1. U.S.S.R. versus U.S.
Typical population densities for some U.S. major
cities on a 40-square-mile basis are on the order of 15,000
people per square mile. 106 From Table XV, a one MT weapon
A, is 45.7 square miles; it follows that
f 50 x 10 V—1_\ m 73 weapons (1 MT each ) (A-10)
\15 x 10 / \45.7/
are required to inflict 50 million casualties on the U.S.
However, all cities are not the same size, requiring higher
numbers of weapons to gain the desired damage. Assuming
that the most populated cities are targeted and the warheads
are placed in the greatest density areas of each city, a
reasonable target mix might be that given in Table XVI. To
account for failures due to launch, guidance, warheads, etc.,
and considering the U.S.S.R. 's policy of using large numbers
of weapons, 200 one-MT warheads possibly represents an
acceptable deterrent for the Soviet Union in this model.



















Remaining 14 cities 2g - Qin top 25 (2 ea)
40 of the top remaining
cruise missile target- 80 20.0
able (2 ea)
Projected













Total One-MT Warheads 140 50 Million
Cities Struck: 66
Note: Cities listed in Appendix D were used in calculations
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2. U.S. versus U.S.S.R .
The problem is different in the Soviet Union
because there are fewer large cities. Where cities exist,
the densities are higher but on the whole, the country is
more rural. Two hundred and one Soviet cities have popula-
tions of more than 100,000 inhabitants. This accounts for
only 301 of the total population. Typical population
densities for most major cities on a 40-square-mile basis
are on the order of 10,000 persons per square mile. Com-
puting these numbers it follows that
/ 60 x 10* \/ 1 \
\10 x 10V \45.7/
130 weapons (1 MT each) (A-ll)
are required to inflict 60 million casualties on the U.S.S.R.
However, like the U.S. not all cities are the same size,
requiring larger numbers of weapons. A reasonable targeting
mix might be that given in Table XVII. To account for
failures due to launch, guidance, re-entry, etc., 250 one-MT
warheads possibly represents a minimum acceptable deterrent
force for the U.S. in this model.
In summary, an acceptable deterrence force the the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. is approximately 250 and 200 one-MT war-
heads, respectively. These numbers are capable of inflicting
unacceptable damage. Then this number must remain after
absorbing a first strike from the aggressor. The U.S.




POTENTIAL U.S. TARGETING SCENARIO
Projected




Cities 4 - 25 (2 ea) 44 16.8
Cities 26 - 66 (1 ea) 40 15.0
Cities 67 - 200 (1 ea) 135_ 17.5




countervalue targeting asymmetries are more advantageous
for the U.S.S.R. Soviet major cities are more dense than
U.S. cities, but only 10 major cities have populations
greater than one million as compared to the U.S. which has
33 cities with populations greater than one million. From
the data displayed in Table XVII and Appendix B, it is
evident that potential targeting for casualties greater
than 60 million (25% of the population) would require
increasingly larger numbers of weapons, eventually approach-
ing an exponential growth rate.
These computed numbers of warheads are commonly
referred to as second-strike weapons which survive the first
strike and are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on
the aggressor and are utilized in the deterrence model
developed in Chapter III. It must be emphasized that this
is a "pure" model which does not consider the large mega-
tonnage the Soviets have available in their SS-9 missiles
which, if considered, would decrease the number of weapons
needed to inflict unacceptable damage on the U.S. It is
also important to emphasize that the quantities obtained
from this model are crude estimates of the number of
delivered warheads required to achieve adequate deterrence
and that the model assumes an undefended defense posture.
3. Targeting Factors
To determine a more accurate force level, the
following items must be included:
169





(3) Losses to a possible first strike.
When considering active defense the delivery
capability must be increased to account for the number of
warheads which will not arrive at their targets. Missile
defenses are quite limited in number as a result of the
SALT negotiations, which allow 100 interceptor missiles at
each of two sites. These interceptor missiles would be a
factor when launching at targets within the ABM defense
area. Assuming the ABM-system protecting Moscow was capable
of destroying 1001 of the incoming RV's launched, 101
warheads would be required for launch against Moscow before
one would actually reach the city. The probability that
the Moscow ABM system is capable of attaining these opera-
tional standards is probably quite remote. Probability
figures approaching 501 may be more realistic, assuming a
saturated attack.
When considering bomber defenses, the probability
of the aircraft penetrating and arriving over the target
is much lower than ballistic missile penetration probability
due to an extensive Soviet anti-bomber defense system.
Bombers are capable of delivering more than one warhead;
hence aircraft successfully penetrating the defenses would
be capable of striking more than one target. Projected
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bomber losses must be included in the total strategic force
requirements
.
Since deterrence is dependent on inflicting
casualties, civil defense measures implemented by a country
can cause a great increase in the number of warheads re-
quired. These defense measures significantly reduce the
lethal radius of each weapon. Table XIV listed the R,-
ranges of .12 mi for a concrete shelter as compared to
1.3 mi for no protection. Scaling the concrete shelter
ranges and utilizing them in the deterrence model computa-
tions increases the number of warheads required by almost
40 times that needed assuming a no-protection status.
Implementing a civil defense program to protect the industri-
al base would be much more difficult and expensive than a
population defense program. The probability that the Soviets
are employing a complete physical industrial base defense
program is probably small. However, a limited defense
program would require an increase in deliverable warheads
to counter that degree of protection attained.
System reliabilities and losses caused by the
opposing side launching a first strike involve complex
calculations and require the development of new models which
can predict probabilities that a warhead will be success-
fully launched and accurately delivered on a designated
target. The contributing factors include: single shot
kill probability (SSKP) ; reliability, terminal kill
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probability, and targeting; reprogramming ; and CMP and EMT,
which will be addressed separately. Davis and Schilling's
article 107 will be utilized to develop the SSKP ; reliability,
terminal kill probability, and targeting; and reprogramming
models
.
F. SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABILITY
SSKP is the probability that a single warhead can
destroy a target. The probability that a single, reliable
warhead can be expected to destroy a given target is a
function of the destructive effort of the warhead on the
target and the accuracy of the warhead. The destructive
effect of a warhead on a given target is expressed in terms
of its lethal radius (LR) : the distance from the point of
the explosion that the warhead will be able to destroy the
target. The accuracy of a warhead is expressed in terms
of its Circular Error Probability (CEP) , the radius of the
circle centered on the target within which the warhead has
a 50-50 chance of landing. If the distribution of shots
in repeated firings is approximately circular normal, the
formula for calculating SSKP (if CEP and LR are expressed
107 Davis, L. E. and Schilling, W. R. , "All You Ever
'
Wanted to Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations but Were
Not Cleared to Ask," Journal of Conflict Resolution
,
v. 17,
No. 2, p. 210, June 197T:
172

in the same units) is 1 8
/LR\





SSKP 1 - .5 \r:E7J (A-12)
In order to use the formula cited above to calculate the
SSKP of a single, reliable warhead against a missile silo,
or any other target, the LR of the warhead must be deter-
mined. The LR of a nuclear explosion is a function of the
yield of the warhead, the hardness of the target, and the
altitude of the burst. Warhead yield is expressed as
previously mentioned in KT or MT. Target hardness is
expressed in terms of the pounds per square inch (psi) of
pressure over normal atmospheric pressure required to destroy
the target.
There are several ways to calculate the LR for warheads
used against hard targets like missile silos. "The Effects
of Nuclear Weapons'* 109 publication contains a graph showing
the distances from ground zero that a one-KT surface burst
will produce peak overpressures from .1 psi to 1000 psi.
Davis and Schilling, op. cit., p. 211
10 9 Glasstone, op. cit., p. 135.
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Applying cube root scaling laws the LR for any other yield
of warhead (Y in kilotons) against a target of the same
hardness can be calculated by the formula
LR
y
= LR1Kt x Y
1/3 (A-13)
For example, to determine the LR of a five-MT warhead
against a target that could be destroyed by 300 psi,
extrapolate from the graph the distance where a one-KT
explosion will produce 300 psi (which is about 220 feet)
and utilize formula (A-13) for obtaining the scaling
solution.
LR5MT
= 220 X 500 ° 1/3 = 3762 feet (.619 NM) (A-14)
This LR value can then be substituted in the SSKP formula
(A-12) to find the SSKP for a five-MT warhead. For this
example, a CEP of .25 nm against a 300 psi target is used.
= 1 - .5 t^7SSKP V / (A-15)
The result of this calculation yields a SSKP of .985.
SSKP calculations are utilized to determine probabilities
of destroying hard targets which are either countervalue
or counterforce in nature. Countervalue targets could
include hardened command and control sites and high
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economic value targets which, when removed in a surgical
manner, could demonstrate resolve. Weapons capable of
obtaining high SSKP would obviously enable a nation greater
foreign policy alternatives.
G. RELIABILITY, TERMINAL KILL PROBABILITY, AND TARGETING
The formula for SSKP is based on the assumption that
the warhead will arrive at the target and explode. In
reality, this is not always the case. There are many
factors which contribute to possible failure in a missile
system between firing the missile and actual detonation of
the warhead on the target. In order to determine the actual
probability of kill, a value must be assigned to the Overall
Reliability (OAR) of the missile system. The OAR represents
an estimate of the probability that first the missile and
then the warhead will function properly during the course
of the entire flight. OAR is the product of the individual
probabilities that the system will not malfunction during
each stage of countdown and launch (Launch Reliability)
and during each stage of flight including: the boost
phase, separation of the re-entry vehicle, penetration of
the atmosphere, and the detonation of the warhead. Assume,
for example, a missile system with the following charac-
teristics: a .95 probability of a successful countdown
and launch; a .95 probability of successful separation
following boost; .95 probability of successful penetration
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following separation; and a .95 probability of successful
detonation following penetration. The overall reliability
of such a system would be .95 or .773.
To compute the composite probability of an individual
warhead actually destroying a target (Terminal Kill
Probability or TKP) , the SSKP is multiplied by the OAR
of the missile system: 110
TKP = SSKP x OAR (A-16)
For example, if the SSKP of the warhead was .94 and the
OAR was .773, the TKP would be .94 x .773 = .727.
Once the TKP of a single warhead is determined, the
probability of destroying the target if more than one war-
head is fired at the same target can be calculated. Assume,
for example, that two warheads (one with a TKP of .65 and
one with a TKP of .75) are fired at the same target. The
probability of the target surviving a hit from the first
warhead is (1-TKP
1 )
or (1-.65), and the probability of the
target surviving a hit from the second warhead is (1-TKP-)
or (1-.75). The probability of the target surviving the







(1-.65) x (1-.75) = .0875.
1 1 o Davis and Schilling, op. cit., p. 217
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The probability of kill of the two warheads (PK
?
, ) is
thus (1-.0875) or .913.
In the event that the warheads being fired at the same
target have the same TKP, the probability that the target
2
will survive a hit from two warheads if (1-TKP) and the
PK 2wh
= 1 ' U-TKP) 2 (A-17)
In the case of "n" warheads (with equal TKPs) , the
probability of kill can be calculated with the formula 111
PK = 1 - (l-TKP) n (A-18)
n
wh
The results of targeting an entire missile force can be
calculated once the Terminal Kill Probabilities for one or
"n" warheads have been computed.
Assume, for example, 1500 warheads (with equal TKPs)
are fired at 1000 targets, the SSKP for each warhead is
.94 and all five reliability factors are .95. Solving the
problem, let x = the number of targets that receive one
warhead and y = the number of targets that receive two
warheads
.





It follows then that
x + y = 1000 targets
x + 2y 1500 warheads
y = 500
x = 500
Hence 500 targets get one warhead each and 500 targets get
two warheads each. Computing the TKP, , utilizing formula
(A- 16)
TKP lwp
= (.94)(.95) 5 = .727 (A-19)
Determining the TKP
2
is obtained by utilizing formula
(A-17) and the resultant number from (A-19)
TKP
2
= 1 - (1-.727) 2 = .926 (A-20)
Hence, to determine the number of targets killed by 1500
warheads, the following computations must be made:
727 x 500 (1 warhead targets) = 363
926 x 500 (2 warhead targets) = 463
(A-21)
826





In a situation in which the number of attacking war-
heads is greater than the number of targets, the number of
targets destroyed could be increased if the attacking power
could identify those missiles that had malfunctioned some-
time during the launch or flight (and whose warheads would
therefore never reach their intended target) and could
assign other missiles to replace those that had failed.
This would improve the chances that all targets would
receive at least one warhead and thereby increase the
efficiency of the attack. This strategy for allocating
warheads to targets requires that the attacker not fire
all of his missiles at once. Some warheads must be held in
reserve to replace those known to have failed. The ability
to identify missiles that have failed and to reprogram
other missiles to take their place is called reprogramming,
or shoot-look-shoot.
In order to calculate the effect of a reprogramming
system, it is necessary to break down the overall relia-
bility into two components: reprogrammable reliability
(RR) and nonreprogrammable reliability (NRR) . RR expresses
the probability that the missile will perform correctly
during that part of launch and flight in which failures can
be identified, and (1-RR) the probability that the missile
will fail during the time failures can be identified.
.
Similarly, NRR expresses the probability that the missile
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will perform correctly during that part of the flight when
failures cannot be identified, and (1-NRR) the probability
that the missile will fail during that time. RR x NRR
always equals OAR. In calculating the effects of an attack
using reprogramming, it is useful to keep in mind that
since all known failures have been replaced, the TKP of
each warhead successfully going toward a target is calcu-
lated by multiplying the SSKP by the NRR. 112
TKP = SSKP x NRR (A- 2 2)
To illustrate the effect of an attack employing a
reprogramming, the data used in the previous example will
be utilized again so a comparison can be made between the
two procedures. Assume that the .773 OAR of the missile
system is the product of five reliabilities: .95 probability
of successful countdown and launch; .95 probability of suc-
cessful boost after launch; .95 probability of successful
separation after boost; .95 probability of successful
penetration after separation; and .95 probability of
successful detonation after penetration. Assume further
that information is available for all failures during
countdown, launch, boost, and separation. The RR of the
3
system would then be .95 = .857, and the NRR would be
2
.95 = .902. Remembering that there were 1000 targets
1 1 2 Davis and Schilling, op. cit., p. 220
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and 1500 warheads, the number of warheads which survive
the first three stages can be calculated
(.95) 3 (1500) = 1285 (A-23)
Solving the problem, let x = the number of targets that
receive one warhead and y = the number of targets that
receive two warheads. It follows that
x + y = 1000 targets
x + 2y = 1285 warheads
y = 285
x = 715
Hence 285 targets get two warheads each and 715 targets
get one warhead each. Now calculating the number of war-
heads surviving using formula (A- 21)




= (.95) 2 x (.94) = .848 (A-24)











The number of targets killed can now be calculated
.848 x 715 (1 warhead targets) = 607
.977 x 285 (2 warhead targets) = 278 (A-26)
885
Comparing the A- 21 and A-26 results, reprogramming has
increased the number of target kills by 59, approximately
6%, which is significant.
In summary, a reprogramming system, by providing
information on a certain percentage of failures in an
attack, enables the attacker to reprogram reserve missiles
to replace these known failures.
I. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
A phenomenon associated with a nuclear explosion (and
one that is relevant for a counterforce weapon) is the so-
called Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) . A nuclear explosion
ionizes the atoms of the atmosphere in its immediate
vicinity, giving rise to electric and magnetic fields
2having an intensity of 100,000 volts per meter (which is
1000 times more intense than a radar beam) 113 which is
sufficient to penetrate an unshielded silo and destroy the
complex and delicate electronic equipment of a missile and
its launching facilities.
113 Defense Nuclear Agency, DNA EMP Awareness Course
,




The EMP, the movement of the air mass near the explo-
sion, the large amounts of debris that the explosion
causes to rise rapidly into the upper atmosphere, and the
persistently high level of radioactivity emanating from
the expanding fireball combine to create an effect, known
as "interference," "screening" or "fratricide." Fratricide
makes it difficult to deliver a re-entry vehicle to the same
point soon after an earlier one has arrived and detonated.
As the second re-entry vehicle enters the atmosphere near
the point where the first exploded, it encounters high
densities of dust that can cause its protective shield to
burn prematurely, or it can be deflected off-target by
the violent winds that persist in the area for considerable
periods of time, or, if it arrives a few seconds after
the first weapon, it could even be destroyed by EMP or the
nuclear radiation emanating from the fireball. This phenome
non could have a significant impact on all warheads having
on-board computers. The EMP electromagnetic spectrum is
broad and extends from very low frequencies into the UHF
band causing interferences with all electronics equipment
including command and control systems.
K. COUNTER MILITARY POTENTIAL
The lethality of a nuclear weapon against a hardened
target is a function of the warhead's yield and accuracy.
183

Lethality can be mathematically expressed as follows : 111+
2/3
CMP = -I T n (A- 27)
(cep;t
where CMP is an expression of the lethality, Y is the yield
in MT, CEP is the accuracy in NM and n is the number of
warheads. By inspection it is evident that as the CEP is
decreased, the lethality is increased and the probability
that the warhead can destroy a hard target is also
increased. Lethality increases much more rapidly with an
improvement in accuracy than with an increase in yield.
Once the accuracy is such that the CEP is smaller than the
radius of the crater excavated by the explosive force of
the weapon, the lethality has reached its maximum value,
since any silo within such a crater would certainly be
destroyed. The lethality factor can be used to describe
both the lethality of a warhead and the lethality needed
to destroy a target. Thus it is possible to calculate
the lethality required to destroy all the offensive-missile
silos in the U.S.S.R. or U.S. with a given probability.
The lethality times the number of warheads determines the
total lethality potential a country can deliver. Addition-
al parameters such as the reliability of re-entry vehicles,
lllf Tsipis, K.
,
"The Calculus of Nuclear Counterforce ,
"
Technology Review, v. 77, p. 38, October/November 1974.
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and the timing of the arrival against a silo must be
considered in making the calculations. The calculations
required to derive these numbers are very complex and will
not be addressed in this study, but it is useful to realize
the relationship between the warhead yield and the accuracy
of the re-entry vehicle.
L. EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE
Equivalent megatonnage (EMT) is a mathematical
expression of a country's countervalue force potential.
EMT can be expressed as follows:
EMT = Y 2/3 n (A-28)
where Y is the yield and n is the number of warheads.
Unlike CMP, the warhead accuracy is not a factor in deter-
mining the equivalent megatonnage because accuracy is not
critical when striking countervalue targets. Large yields
increase a country's EMT and the SS-9 provides the Soviets
with that capability. Yield times the number of warheads
in a country's force provides a measure of the potential
countervalue capability. The Soviets' large throw weight
advantage enables them to potentially launch more than





The mutual assured destruction framework has led us to
the position where our strategic weapons policy is partly
a result of a mathematical model of force design. Within
this model exist a series of points or areas in which the
numbers and types of missiles the United States and the
Soviet Union should maintain for stable deterrence. A
deterrence model can be graphically represented. 115 See
Figure 5.
The United States and the Soviet Union represent
exponents in a two-party duel which will be represented by
X and Y, respectively. Should X possess N missiles of a
particular type and Y possess N missiles of the same basic
type, this situation can be represented by a point P on a
graph, as depicted in Figure 5, with certain cartesian
coordinates (N ,N )
.
The deterrence model will be developed using the
number of land-based ICBM missiles the United States and
the Soviet Union had deployed at the time of the Interim
Agreement of May 27, 1972. It is believed the Soviets
about 1618 and the U.S. 1054. As previously discussed,
115 Legault, A. and Lindsey, G. , The Dynamics of the






















Number of missiles possessed by X
Figure 5. Coordinates indicating the number of
missiles possessed by X and Y
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deterrence depends on a nation's ability to deliver
unbearable or unacceptable damage, even after absorbing
a counterforce first strike. In order to develop a
mathematical model of deterrence, numbers must be placed
on adjectives. What damage is considered unbearable or
unacceptable for a country to absorb? Secretary McNamara
indicated that in the case of the Soviet Union, destruction
of one-fourth to one-third of her population and one-half
of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective
deterrent. Such a level of destruction would probably
represent adequate punishment to any twentieth century
industrial nation. 116
Legault and Lindsey 117 have developed an algebraic
expression for a deterrence model which will be utilized
for this discussion. This is a pure model derived to
aid and simplify the understanding of deterrent force
theory. Chapter III-B amplifies this model by employing
more realistic numbers of missiles which are needed to
inflict unacceptable damage. U is a threshold, representing
the number of Y's missiles which could inflict damage on X's
cities, which is considered intolerable for X, and beyond
which X would be deterred from any further offensive action
for fear of provoking such injury. Similarly, U is a
116 McNamara, loc. cit.
117 Legault and Lindsey, op. cit., p. 170-188.
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threshold representing the damage X's missiles could inflict
on Y's cities, which is considered intolerable for Y. The
level of damage either side cannot bear is that level
corresponding to the destructive power of U or U 's missiles
x y
used in a counter city attack.
The deterrence model proposes that the two thresholds U
and U need not necessarily be the same number of missiles.
One nation may be prepared to face greater sacrifices than
the other, influencing the "unacceptable damage" threshold
the other may perceive as unbearable. Hence X and Y may not
make the same estimates of U and U . A key point which
x y ' r
must be emphasized in building this model is that it is X's
estimate of what Y perceives is unacceptable damage to X
and U is the number of missiles required to inflict that
perceived unbearable damage. Similarly, U is the
number of missiles required to inflict what X perceives
as unacceptable damage to Y and U is the number of missiles
required to inflict that damage.
Figure 6 shows a rectangle OU AU with sides N =0,& & x y x '
N = 0, N = U , and N = U . Any point such as Po which
is inside this rectangle represents a situation in which
there is no deterrence in either direction, since N < U
' x x
and N < U . There obviously must be degrees of deterrence,
so that if X expected to have his cities hit by (U -1)
missiles, he would be "nearly deterred." In constructing



























Number of missiles possessed by X
Figure 6. Threshold of deterrence
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assumption is made that U and U points are where X and Y
are deterred. U and U ' actually represent the number
of missiles (warheads) that must survive a first strike
(commonly known as the second-strike force) which are
launched by the attacked country against the attacker's
cities (countervalue) and are capable of inflicting unac-
ceptable damage to her population and industrial capacity.
Hence, the theory of mutual assured destruction.
When the point P (N , N ) in Figure 6 is outside the
x y
corner marked "no deterrence," the situation becomes more
complex. Suppose that X has a number N missiles greater
than U„ (that is , N > U ). X can keep U of his missilesX XX X
in reserve to threaten Y's cities and use the remaining
(N -U ) to attack Y's missiles (counterforce strike). Ifv x x^ v J
the attack is initiated, a certain number of Y's missiles
would be destroyed. The key factor which must be considered
by X is how many of Y's missiles can be destroyed, using
(N -U ) missiles for the attack? If Y is left with at
least U missiles, Y can retaliate against X's cities and
inflict unacceptable damage. Hence, the deterrence model
functions on the principle that unless the potential attack-
er can destroy enough missiles in a counterforce strike to
reduce the number of missiles below the U or U level, the
x y '
attacker is deterred. The potential attacker would not
have a first-strike capability and the attacked country
would have a second-strike capability.
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The number of missiles that could be destroyed in a
counterforce strike depends on a number of factors, among
which are the accuracy and warhead yield of the attacking
missiles and the vulnerability (hardness) of the missiles
under attack.
Suppose that C designates the probability that, if
one of X's missiles is fired at, one of Y's missile silos,
the target will be destroyed. Conversely, the probability
that one of Y's missiles can destroy one of X's missile silos
is designated C . The coefficients C and C are called& y x y
the "coefficients of counterforce effectiveness" of X and
Y's missiles, respectively.
Submarines at sea are considered invulnerable; hence
the C and C counterforce coefficients' would be equal to
x y n
zero. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have a second-strike
capability deployed on submarine -launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) platforms. This launcher platform invulnerability
increases the stability of the deterrence and reduces the
probability of either side initiating a first-strike
counterforce attack. In this model, Figure 7, there is no
counterforce capability.
If there is no effective ABM defense for the cities,
then the conditions for mutual deterrence are simply
N > U , N > U . All P(N , N J points on Figure 7 in thex x y y x y
large area above and to the right of a point A represent a
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rectangle to the lower left, there is no deterrence. Two
other zones remain labeled unilateral deterrence. In the
lower zone, right of U A on Figure 7, N < U so X is not
x y y
deterred by Y, but N > U so Y is deterred by X. Simi-
Jv A.
larly, in the upper left zone, above U A, N < U so Y is
not deterred by X, but N > U so X is deterred by Y. These
two areas are
Next consider the case where the coefficients of
counterforce effectiveness (C and C J are both greater
than zero (but less than one) . Assume X is contemplating
a counterforce strike using (N -U ) missiles against the
-A A.
N silos of Y. As previously discussed, everything depends
on the number of Y's missiles which survive after absorb-
ing a counterforce strike from X. If X is not capable of
destroying enough of Y's missiles to reduce her force to
less than U , X will not be able to strike. As an example,
suppose that the thresholds of deterrence are U = 100
and U = 100. In this example, U is the U.S. and U is
the U.S.S.R. These are theoretical numbers which represent
an acceptable damage against an undefended defense posture
assuming each country subscribes to the MAD theory.
To construct more accurate force levels, defense (ABM
and air), civil defense, systems reliabilities and losses
due to a possible first strike comparisons must be con-
sidered and factored into the model. SALT negotiations
limited the number of ABM sites each country can deploy
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(100 interceptor missiles at each of two. sites) and the
U.S. recently decommissioned the only site completed in
this country. Hence the Soviets have an advantage with
their operational ABM Moscow site. The Soviets maintain
an elaborate anti-bomber defense compared to the U.S.,
decreasing the probability of our bombers penetrating the
defenses and striking their assigned targets. Civil
defense has a high priority in the U.S.S.R. to protect
their population and industrial base as compared to no
conscious preparation and practice for civil defense in
the U.S. These factors increase the number of warheads
the U.S. must maintain in its inventory to inflict unac-
ceptable damage on the Soviet population.
For the purpose of constructing this model, these
factors will not be considered in the interest of keeping
the model simple to demonstrate concepts. All these factors
obviously would have to be considered and factored into
the "real-world" model force level computations.
The U = 100 and U = 100 thresholds are indicated on
x y
Pigure 8, which also shows a number of points P, all
representing N = 1050 missiles for X, but various numbers
N for Y. For this model the counterforce effectiveness
coefficient C is 0.5 so that a missile belonging to X and
aimed at one of Y's silos has a 50 per cent probability of
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Figure 8. Deterrence of X by Y.
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Consider first the point P(N , N ), for which N = 1050
Jv y jc
and N = 1600. X could launch (N -U ) = 1000 missiles
against 1000 of Y's 1600 silos. But with X's C being 0.5,
X could expect to destroy only 500 of Y's silos
(0.5 x 1000 = 500). Y's silos remaining (1600 - 500 = 1100)
would be sufficient to destroy X eleven times over consider-
ing that U = 100 is the unacceptable damage level of X.
Clearly P is well within the zone where X is deterred by
Y from attempting a disarming first strike. Take the
example now where N is less than 1600 missiles, as
illustrated by the series of points P', P'', P''', and P'''',
all of which have N = 1050 missiles. A unilateral disarma-
ment by Y could lead to just such a series of points.
At P f
,
Y has N' = 1000 missiles. The 1000 missiles
of X attacking 1000 silos of Y would leave 500 surviving
(0.5 x 1000 = 500), still five times the tolerable
threshold U = 100. Hence P' is inside the zone where
X is deterred by Y.
Now take the case with N '' = 450, marked by P''.
With 1000 missiles to aim at 450 silos, X can now afford
to aim two of his missiles at each of 350 silos, and three
each at the remaining 100 silos, so (350 x 2) + (100 x 3) =
700 + 300 = 1000 missiles. Employing probability laws,
the number of silos expected to survive the attack will
be 350 x 0.5 x 0.5 = 87.5 of those attacked by two missiles
apiece, plus 100 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 = 12.5 of those attacked
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by three missiles apiece, for a total of 87.5 + 12.5 = 100
missiles surviving out of the 450. One hundred Y missiles
remaining is the threshold of deterrence U
,
enabling Y to
retaliate with his second strike and inflict unacceptable
damage on X. Hence, when N >_ 450, X is deterred from
attacking Y, but when N < 450, X is not deterred.
P'» marks the point between a state of mutual deterrence
and a state of unilateral deterrence, unilateral deterrence
being in a state where X is not deterred, i.e., below the
state of mutual deterrence. p«»» and P'»«» are well into
the unilateral zone where X is not deterred from launching
a counterforce first-strike against Y and where Y would not
have enough surviving missiles to inflict unacceptable
damage on X. SLBM's are not considered in this example.
This model has thus far assumed the counterforce
effectiveness (C ) of X's missiles to be 0.5. Assume the
C value were higher; the number of missile silos Y must
have (N' f ), which is providing the deterrence, would have
to be larger in order to have at least U = 100 survive the
y
attack by (N -U ) = 1000 missiles. Assume that the accuracy
of missiles improves by a factor of two every five years and
X reduces the CEP of his missiles to a counterforce coeffi-
cient of 0.9 (C = 0.9). If U = 100 missiles were to
x y
survive, Y would require 1000 missiles in his force
(1000 x 0.9 = 900 + 100 U = 1000). Should X increase
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the counterforce coefficient to 1 (C = 1) , Y would need
1100 missiles (1000 x 1 = 100 + 100 Uy = 1100) to deter X.
This model has thus far fixed the number of X's
missiles at N = 1050. Leaving U , U , and C fixed, N
x & x* y' x ' x
will be varied and the geometric locus of P M determined
for all values of N . The object of the calculation is to
construct a continuous curve joining all the points P ,f
(N
,
N lf ) such that an attack by (N -U ) missiles againstX y XX
N ' f silos would leave precisely U silos undamaged. The
curve AP' * on Figure 9 shows this locus, and it will be
referred to as the limit for the deterrence of X. Every
point P' (N , N' ) falling above the limit of deterrence
x y
curve represents a state in which X is deterred. All
points P ,fT (N , N ' ' ') falling below the curve represent a
x y
state in which X is not deterred and has the ability to
launch a counterforce first-strike, destroying enough of
Y f s missiles, U > 100, where Y cannot inflict unacceptable
damage on X.
Thus far this model has addressed only the deterrence
of X by Y. Using the same methodology, the deterrence of
Y by X can be calculated and the limit for the deterrence
of Y curve constructed. To every number of missiles N
possessed by Y there corresponds a number of silos N''
belonging to X, such that an attack by (N -U ) missiles
against the N ,f silos will leave exactly U surviving,
x x
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Figure 9. Limits for the deterrence of X and Y.
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Figure 9 depicts both, "limit for the deterrence"
curves, labeled AP and AQ. All points falling to the
right of AQ represent a situation where Y is deterred
and all points falling to the left, Y is not deterred.
All points falling in the zone between AQ and AP represent
a state where both X and Y are deterred. This zone shall
be labeled the zone of mutual deterrence. The curves AQ and
AP were constructed using a counterforce coefficient of
0.5. (C = C = 0.5).
x y
Another model was constructed using a counterforce
coefficient of 0.9, C = C = 0.9, and C = C = 0,
x y x y
Figure 10. The zone of mutual deterrence becomes much
narrower for high counterforce coefficients, making the
deterrence model less stable. Notice the case C = C =0,
x y
which occurs when all missiles are on submarines; the
zone of mutual deterrence is very large making the deter-
rence model very stable.
The deterrence model has been constructed thus far
assuming each attacking missile has only one warhead.
Assuming all targeted silos are spaced a greater distance
apart than the lethal diameter of the attacker's weapon
aimed against those silos, the greatest possible coeffi-
cient of counterforce effectiveness of the attacker
missiles is C = 1. However, MIRVed missiles contain
more than one warhead which further complicates the model.




























Figure 10. Variation in the limits of the deterrence
zones as a function of counterforce efficiency.
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one missile may be able to destroy more than one silo.
As in the previous example, C and C are the probabilities
x y
that one of the warheads will destroy the silo it is
targeted against. C or C will probably be less than one.
x y
However, considering the increased number of available
warheads, it is quite possible that by being able to target
more warheads in one missile against the same target, the
probability could become greater than one (n C > 1)
.
X X
Figure 11 illustrates this situation.
Developing the model using MIRV's, the expected number
of missiles (silos) destroyed in a counterforce attack by
(N -U ) missiles, each with n individually targeted war-
A. X X
heads in each missile, and each warhead with an individual
probability of C of destroying a silo, is the same asX
for an attack by (N -U )n single missiles, each with aX A X
coefficient of C . Figure 11 illustrates a double unstableX
zone between the limit for the deterrence of X and Y.
Each missile carrying n small warheads will carry
Jv.
less total explosive yield than one large warhead of the
same throw weight, but since each warhead is independently
targeted, each re-entry vehicle will have a separate TKP,
increasing the probability of destroying a targeted silo.
This doubly unstable zone is the result of one silo being
targeted by more than one warhead yielding TKP's which
exceed one (n C > 1). The significance of this doubleX X













Figure 11. Limits of the deterrence zones when
counterforce efficiency exceeds unit.
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counterforce first strike to destroy the other's silos and
the attacker would still have enough missiles remaining to
launch an effective countervalue strike against his cities.
Figure 11 illustrates the deterrence zones of X and Y,
assuming that both n C and N C are greater than one. Theto xx y y
curves start at the point A(U , U ); the upper right corner
x y
of the "no deterrence" rectangle are enclosed by OU AU .& / x y
This model is significantly different from the single-warhead
missile model discussed. The curve marking the limit for
the deterrence of X starts from A with a slope of n C
,
.A. A.
making an angle of more than 45° to the horizontal axis
of N . For larger values of N there are more targeted
A. a.
warheads than there are silos and the slope is reduced.
The curve marking the limit for the deterrence of Y starts
from A with a slope of less than 45° to the horizontal axis.
This slope increases for larger values of N where there
are more targeted warheads than silos. The slope of the
first segment of the curve marking the limit for the deter-
rence of Y, which also begins at A, has a slope of 1/n c .
If the slope is less than the second, a zone of mutual
deterrence opens out from point A. However, if the curve
marking the limit for the deterrence of X should commence
at A with a larger slope than the other curve, then the
two curves enclose a zone where neither X nor Y is
deterred, and each has a first-strike capability. The
condition for the existence of a double unstable zone
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is then n C > 1/n C ornCnC > 1. MIRV contributes twoxx y y xxyy
separate outputs to the deterrence model. In a counterforce
role, double unstable zones result and in a countervalue
role deterrence is reinforced since a greater number of
smaller warheads can more efficiently distribute lethal
damage over a population center than one large warhead.
In constructing the previous models three states of
deterrence were identified: mutual deterrence, unilateral
deterrence, or no deterrence. As previously discussed,
deterrence is what prevents attack. To further develop
the significance of these models, the concept of stability
will be developed. Stability could be defined as the
absence of a rational motive to launch an attack. When a
rational motive exists on either side to launch a first
strike, there is instability. However, since both powers
have a formidable invulnerable second-strike capability,
the country that launches a first strike must expect to
absorb unacceptable damage. As a result of this potential
unbearable punishment, deterrence evolves.
Instability is not the simple converse of deterrence.
It is possible to have a state of stable deterrence or of
unstable deterrence. Stability is not necessarily associated
with near equality of forces on both sides either. Assume X
possesses a very large force but Y does not have enough
missiles to inflict punishment on X by an unopposed
countervalue first strike* a stable and unilateral
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deterrence state would exist. Y would be deterred by X but
X would not be deterred. Should Y begin accumulating missiles,
alarming X over the intended use of these warheads, X could
disarm Y before reaching, the threshold of deterrence U
,
and the state of unilateral deterrence would have become
unstable.
Figure 12 illustrates these points. The curve AP 11
represents the limit for the deterrence of X. Assume a
situation where the number of missiles falls on a point
lying below AP*'; X would not be deterred from making a
counterforce strike against Y's silos intending to disarm
Y. Y realizing the lack of capability to attack X with
complete success is deterred by X. Hence all area below
AP ,T represents a state of unilateral deterrence. However,
the zones marked p»'» and p ,,f ' are markedly different.
The zone p»'» is an area where N' ' ' U which means Y has
more missiles than required for the threshold of deterrence
U . Should Y use these missiles to launch an intolerable
countervalue strike against X, X would have sufficient
missiles remaining to annihilate Y's cities resulting in a
suicidal act by Y. However, Y would possess the capability
to conduct such an attack and X has the capability to then
annihilate Y; hence this zone is labeled unstable unilateral
deterrence. The zone labeled P'''' is an area where Y does
not possess the missiles to inflict unacceptable damage to
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Figure 12. Stable and unstable deterrence.
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rational motive for attacking Y and hence the zone is
labeled state unilateral deterrence.
The curve AQ is the reciprocal of the curve AP f '
and all factors apply to the zone to the left of AQ as
those applied to the zone below AP''.
The rectangle marked OU AU is a zone without& x y
deterrence or instability since neither side possesses
enough missiles to inflict unacceptable damage on the other.
The zone labeled AQ and AP is an area of stable mutual
deterrence. All points (combinations of X and Y's missiles)
falling in this zone will result in stable mutual deterrence
since neither side has the ability to launch a counterforce
first strike and destroy enough silos to keep the other side






The following pages consist of documents and
agreements between the United States and the Soviet
Union from the Strategic Arms Limitation talks.
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UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Interim agreement and protocol signed at Moscow on
May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972, with
agreed interpretations, common understandings, and uni-
lateral statements.
INTERIM AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (1) and this Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more
favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting
strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
Taking into account the relationship between strategic
offensive and defensive arms,
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Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Parties undertake not to start construction of
additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.
Article II
The Parties undertake not to convert land-based
launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types
deployed prior to 1964 into land-based launchers for
heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.
Article III
The Parties undertake to limit submarine -launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic
missile submarines to the numbers operational and under
construction on the date of signature of this Interim
Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines
constructed under procedures established by the Parties
as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of
older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on
older submarines.
Article IV
Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement,
modernization and replacement of strategic offensive
X T.IAS 6839; 21 UST 490.
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ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim
Agreement may be undertaken.
Article V
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of
compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement,
each Party shall use national technical means of verifi-
cation at its disposal in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the
national technical means of verification of the other
Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article.
3. Each party undertakes not to use deliberate
concealment measures which impede verification by national
technical means of compliance with the provisions of this
Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require
changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or
overhaul practices.
Article VI
To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use
the Standing Consultative Commission established under
Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-





The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations
for limitation on strategic offensive arms. The obliga-
tions provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not
prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on
strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the
course of further negotiations.
Article VIII
1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force 1
upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each
Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously
with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.
2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for
a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agree-
ment on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive
arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active
follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an
agreement as soon as possible.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim
Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized
its supreme interest. It shall give notice of its decision
x Oct. 3, 1972.
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to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from
this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests
Done at Mowcow on May 26, 19 72, in two copies each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being
equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:







President of the United
States of America
General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU
J Richard Nixon.




TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT
TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Having Agreed on certain limitations relating to
submarine -launched ballistic missile launchers and modern
ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures,
in the Interim Agreement,
Have agreed as follows:
The Parties understand that, under Article III of the
Interim Agreement, for the period during which that
Agreement remains in force
:
The U.S. May have no more than 710 ballistic missile
launchers or submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern
ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have
no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines
and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.
Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines
up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S. over 656
ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines,
and in the U.S.S.R. over 740 ballistic missile launchers
on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under
construction, may become operational as replacements for
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equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older
types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers
on older submarines.
The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine,
regardless of type, will be counted against the total
level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of
the Interim Agreement.
Done at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972.
FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
President of the United
States of America
General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU
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AGREED INTERPRETATIONS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS,
AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS
1. Agreed Interpretations
(a) Initialed Statements. The document set forth
below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the
Delegations on May 26, 1972:
Agreed Statements Regarding the Interim Agreement between
The United States of America and The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
(A)
The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers
referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be
launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of
ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the north-
eastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern
border of the continental U.S.S.R.
(B)
The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM
launchers under active construction as of the date of
signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.
(C)
The Parties understand that in the process of moderni-
zation and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM




The Parties understand that during the period of the
Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase
in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers,
or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based
heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that con-
struction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges
shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and
training.
(E)
The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction
of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and
ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being
replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will
be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials
of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the
shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling
or destruction, and timely modification thereof, will be
accomplished under procedures to be agreed on in the
Standing Consultative Commission.
(b) Common Understandings. Common understanding of the





A. INCREASE IN ICBM SILO DIMENSIONS
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972
The Parties agree that the term "significantly increased"
means that an increase will not be greater than ten to fif-
teen per cent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM
silo launchers.
Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded
to the Soviet understanding:
B. STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972
The United States proposes that the sides agree that,
with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's
Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement
on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement, 1 agreement
establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the
follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the
following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in
session, any consultation desired by either side under
these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delega-
tions; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements
x See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of
Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed
Sept. 30, 1971. TIAS 7186; 22 UST 1590.
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for any desired consultations under these Articles may be
made through diplomatic channels.
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis,
he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the
Soviet understanding.
C. STANDSTILL
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement
In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side,
the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis
that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations
of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning
from the date of signature of these two documents.
In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement
on May 20, 1972:
The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet
statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obliga-
tions beginning from date of signature but we would like
to make clear our understanding that this means that,
pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would
take any action prohibited by the agreements after they
had entered into force. This understanding would continue
to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory
of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval





(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were
made during the negotiations by the United States
Delegation:
A. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following
statement
:
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the
U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more
complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, follow-
ing agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement
on certain measures with respect to the limitation of
strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes
that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be
to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the
survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory
forces. The U.S.S.R. Delegation has also indicated that the
objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the
achievement of an agreement providing for more complete
limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides
recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward
the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic
arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic
offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five
years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should
that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal
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from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such
a situation occur, nor do we believe that the U.S.S.R.
does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation
that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches
to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic
offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the
Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration
of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this
statement of the U.S. position.
B. LAND -MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on
May 20, 1972:
In connection with the important subject of land-
mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the
Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its
proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly
prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers.
I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing
to defer the question of limitation of operational land-
mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on
more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms,
the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational
land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the





The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on
May 20, 1972:
I wish to emphasize the importance that the United
States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including




The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on
May 26, 1972:
The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation
has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a
heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S.
Delegation believes it necessary to state the following:
The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume
significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM
now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The
U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will
give due account to this consideration.
(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was
made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here
with the U.S. reply. On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov
made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet
Side:"
Taking into account that modern ballistic middile
submarines are presently in the possession of not only
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the U.S, but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union
agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim
"Freeze" Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to
50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic
missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with
656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the
period of effectiveness of the Agreement, U.S. allies in
NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines
to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have opera-
tional or under construction on the date of signature of
the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a
corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In
the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question
of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the
Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the
strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered
missile submarines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Therefore,
the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and
above all the question of liquidating the American missile
submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately
resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations.
On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to
Minister Semenov:
The United States side has studied the "statement made
by the Soviet side" of May 17 concerning compensation for
submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third
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countries. The United States does not accept the validity
of the considerations in that statement.
On May 26, Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral state-
ment made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the
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